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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to study the role of progressive tax rules on the
allocations of steady state and the stability properties in a Ramsey economy
with heterogeneous households and borrowing constraints. Since labor supply
is elastic, considering diﬀerent tax rates on capital and labor incomes is relevant.
The steady state analysis allows us to highlight the existence of diﬀerent types
of stationary equilibria. While patient agents always hold capital, impatient
ones have or not positive savings, depending on the level of real interest rate.
Furthermore, it is not always optimal for all households to have a positive labor
supply.
Studying the comparative statics and local dynamics, we focus on the steady
state with a segmented population: patient households own the whole stock of
capital, while the impatient ones are workers. Varying the population sizes and
the tax rates, we underline the crucial role of ﬁscal progressivity and endogenous
labor. Moreover, in contrast to many contributions, we prove that progressive
tax rules can promote expectation-driven ﬂuctuations and endogenous cycles,
which means that progressivity can be inopportune to stabilize macroeconomic
volatility.
Keywords: Progressive taxation, heterogeneous agents, borrowing constraint,
endogenous labor supply, steady state allocation, macroeconomic stability.
Résumé
L'objectif de ce papier est d'étudier le rôle de taxes progressives sur les
allocations stationnaires et les propriétés de stabilité dans un modèle de Ramsey
avec agents hétérogènes et contraintes d'emprunt. Comme l'oﬀre de travail est
élastique, il est pertinent de considérer des taux de taxe diﬀérents sur les revenus
du capital et du travail. L'analyse de l'état stationnaire nous permet d'exhiber
diﬀérents types d'équilibres. Alors que les agents patients détiennent toujours
du capital, les impatients vont avoir une épargne positive ou non suivant le
niveau du taux d'intérêt. Par ailleurs, il n'est pas toujours optimal pour tous
les agents d'oﬀrir du travail.
Pour étudier la statique comparative et la dynamique locale, nous concen-
trons notre attention sur un état stationnaire caractérisé par une population
segmentée : les agents patients détiennent tout le stock de capital et les impa-
tients sont les seuls à oﬀrir du travail. Faisant varier les tailles des populations
ou le niveau des taux de taxes, nous soulignons le rôle prépondérant de la pro-
gressivité marginale et du travail endogène. De plus, au contraire de la plupart
des résultats existants, nous montrons que l'introduction de taxes progressives
peut favoriser l'émergence de ﬂuctuations endogènes, signiﬁant que la progres-
sivité peut être inadéquate pour stabiliser la volatilité macroéconomique.
Mots-clés: Taxation progressive, agents hétérogènes, contrainte d'emprunt, oﬀre
de travail endogène, état stationnaire, stabilité macroéconomique.
JEL classiﬁcation: C62, H20, E32.
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1 Introduction
Since the seminal contribution of Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (1997), several pa-
pers have analyzed the (de-)stabilizing role of balanced-budget ﬁscal policy rules.
As shown by Guo and Lansing (1998), it is well-known that in one-sector Ramsey
model with representative agents, progressive tax rates can stabilize macroeco-
nomic ﬂuctuations, by preventing the economy from expectations-driven ﬂuctu-
ations. Introducing variable tax rates in the Benhabib and Farmer (1994) model,
they recognize in the labor market and the progressivity on labor income the
key ingredients for macroeconomic (in-)stability.
However, there is little doubt that the analysis of taxation (through its
possible redistributive eﬀects) and progressivity (under the assumption that
each individual is aware of the tax rule and the eﬀects on his disposable income)
makes more sense in models with heterogeneous households. This is why in this
paper, the dynamic eﬀects of progressivity in taxation are studied taking into
account agents' heterogeneity.
When inﬁnite-lived households, who face a borrowing constraint, have not
only heterogeneous endowments and instantaneous utility functions, but also
heterogeneous discount factors, Sarte (1997) shows that, under a progressive
taxation on income, even the less patient consumers can hold capital at the
steady state. Therefore, in contrast to the case without government intervention
(see Becker (1980)), the steady state allocation is no longer characterized by a
degenerate capital distribution, where the most patient agent hold the whole
capital stock.1 The reason is that the after-tax interest rates can be diﬀerent
for each type of household because of the progressive taxation. In a quite similar
model, Sorger (2002) has also studied local dynamics in a neighborhood of the
steady state where all consumers hold capital. He gives an example where the
steady state can be locally indeterminate and endogenous cycles of period two
can occur.
Our paper aims to make a more general and extensive analysis of progressive
tax rules on the allocations of steady state and local dynamics in economies
with heterogeneous households. In the spirit of Bosi and Seegmuller (2007),
we extend the Ramsey model with borrowing constraints and heterogeneous
households, i.e. with heterogeneous capital endowments, instantaneous utility
functions and discount factors, to the case with endogenous labor supply. In
contrast to Sarte (1997) and Sorger (2002), such a framework allows us to take
in account diﬀerentiated taxes on capital and labor incomes.2 Without loss of
generality, we consider two types of heterogeneous households and we provide
a complete analysis of stationary solutions. In addition, focusing on the steady
state where only the most patient owns capital, we characterize exhaustively
1Recent contributions also prove the existence of steady states where impatient consumers,
with market power in the capital market, can hold capital. See, for instance, Becker and Foias
(2007), Sorger (2002, 2004, 2008).
2Hence, we also throw a bridge between the two aforementioned approaches: the former
with representative agents and endogenous labor supply; the latter with heterogeneous con-
sumers without preferences on leisure.
3
the local dynamics. Namely, we show that a higher marginal progressivity3
in capital or labor taxation not necessarily stabilizes business cycles, but can
rather promote expectations-driven ﬂuctuations and endogenous cycles.4
After characterizing the intertemporal equilibrium, we show that, when the
stationary value of the real interest rate is not too large, there exists a steady
state where only the most patient households supply capital. In contrast, when
it is large enough, there exists a stationary equilibrium where all the agents
hold capital. We also prove that it is not always optimal for anybody to supply
labor. Concerning the uniqueness of the stationary equilibrium, we highlight
the crucial role of marginal progressivity in capital taxation.
We pursue the steady state analysis by considering the eﬀects of a variation
in the population sizes of patient and impatient households as well as in the
tax rates, on the one hand, on the stationary values of aggregate capital and
product and, on the other hand, on individual incomes and welfare. For the
sake of simplicity, we focus on a steady state where only patient consumers hold
capital and only impatient supply labor.5 Such an equilibrium is of interest
because of the endogenous split of population in two classes, capitalists and
workers (see also Bosi and Seegmuller (2007)), and provides a foundation of
models with social segmentation such as Mankiw (2000), Michel and Pestieau
(1999) or Woodford (1989).6 Among others, we show that the ratio of sizes
patient/impatient agents aﬀects the capital-labor ratio because of the progres-
sivity in capital taxation. Moreover, taking into account an elastic labor supply
can reverse some results, according to the degree of marginal progressivity and
the elasticities of intertemporal and capital-labor substitution.
In this paper, dynamics are studied through a local analysis, focusing on
the neighborhood of the steady state which is characterized, as seen above,
by a polar segmentation in patient capitalists who hold capital, and impatient
workers who supply labor. We show that marginal progressivity promotes the
existence of cycles by increasing the degree of capital-labor substitution com-
patible with the existence of two-period cycles. A higher marginal progressivity
in capital or labor taxation promotes also expectation-driven ﬂuctuations by
enlarging the range of parameter values (capital-labor substitution) compatible
with indeterminacy.
To further analyze the role of marginal progressivity of labor taxation, we
3Throughout this paper, the progressivity of taxation is deﬁned in marginal terms. We
observe that such a measure is one adopted by Musgrave and Thin (1948) in their seminal
paper.
4Notice that in their recent contributions, Dromel and Pintus (2007) and Lloyd Braga et
al. (2008) study the role of progressivity and tax-rate variability on indeterminacy within a
model à la Woodford (1986) where consumers are also heterogeneous. But, in contrast to our
paper, they assume an ex-ante segmentation of the population in two types of households and
introduce money. Moreover, none of these papers consider a simultaneous taxation on both
capital and labor income.
5Such a stationary equilibrium where a part of population is ﬁnance constrained and con-
sumes his current income is in accordance with empirical evidence. See for instance Bacchetta
and Gerlach (1997) or Cushing (1992). For a critical survey, see Attanasio (1999).
6Thibault (2005) obtains a closely related result using an overlapping generations model
with heterogeneous altruistic agents.
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consider the occurrence of business cycles when patient agents supply labor,
while holding the capital stock. For the sake of simplicity, a ﬂat tax on capital
income is introduced. As above, we ﬁnd that increasing marginal progressivity
promotes the occurrence of endogenous cycles. In addition, local indeterminacy
arises under a suﬃciently large (distortionary) tax rate on capital income. Then,
a larger progressivity on labor tax increases the range of capital-labor substi-
tution compatible with expectations-driven ﬂuctuations, but not for whatever
parametrization.
Therefore, in contrast to Ramsey models with heterogeneous households but
without taxation,7 the steady state, where only the most patient households
have positive savings, can be locally indeterminate. As seen above, capital tax-
ation is a key ingredient for the emergence of ﬂuctuations due to self-fulﬁlling
expectations. Moreover, in most of the cases, the larger the marginal progres-
sivity, the more likely expectation-driven ﬂuctuations and endogenous cycles.
Thus, our conclusions diﬀer from most of those existing in the theoretical liter-
ature concerned with one-sector models. However, it is not unworthy to notice
that a peculiarity of our model is a kind of market incompleteness because
of the existence of a borrowing constraint. More generally, this paper allows
us to argue that, following for instance redistributive arguments, one should in-
crease carefully progressivity or the tax rate on capital because this can promote
macroeconomic volatility.
This paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we present the
model. In Section 3, we characterize the intertemporal equilibrium. Section
4 is devoted to the existence and uniqueness of steady state. In Section 5,
we study the comparative statics of a steady where patient consumers supply
capital and impatient ones work. In Section 6, we analyze the local dynamics,
while concluding remarks are provided in Section 7. Many technical details and
proofs are gathered in the Appendix.
2 The model
We consider a discrete time (t = 0, 1, ...,∞) model with three types of agents:
heterogeneous consumers, a representative ﬁrm and the government.
2.1 Consumers
Households are represented by inﬁnite-lived heterogeneous agents with endoge-
nous labor supply and borrowing constraints. Consumers have diﬀerent initial
capital endowments and preferences. In this respect, there is a twofold kind
of heterogeneity in tastes: on the one hand, heterogeneous discounting; on the
other hand, diﬀerent instantaneous utilities in consumption and leisure across
the households.
7See for instance Becker and Foias (1987, 1994), where labor supply is exogenous, and Bosi
and Seegmuller (2007), where labor supply is elastic.
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Without loss of generality, assume that there are two types of heterogeneous
inﬁnite-lived agents, labeled by i = 1, 2 according to their discount factors:
0 < β2 < β1 < 1 (1)
Total population is constant, with size n > 0. The population sizes of both
types of consumers are also constant. To ﬁx ideas, ni denotes the population
size of households having the discount factor βi, with n1 + n2 = n.
A consumer i is endowed with the initial amount of capital ki0 ≥ 0, such that
the initial aggregate capital stock is strictly positive, K0 =
∑2
i=1 niki0 > 0,
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and, at each period, with one unit of time that he shares between labor and
leisure. We denote his consumption and labor supply at period t with cit and
lit. Preferences are represented by a separable utility function:
∞∑
t=0
βti [ui (cit) + vi (1− lit)] (2)
satisfying the following assumption:
Assumption 1 ui (ci) and vi (1− li) are continuous functions deﬁned on [0,+∞)
and [0, 1], and C2 on (0,+∞) and (0, 1), respectively; strictly increasing (u′i (ci) >
0, v′i (1− li) > 0) and strictly concave (u′′i (ci) < 0, v′′i (1− li) < 0). In addition,
the Inada conditions limci→0 u′i (ci) = limli→1 v′i (1− li) = +∞ are veriﬁed.
The intertemporal substitution is captured by the following elasticities:
(σ1i, σ2i) ≡
(
− u
′
i (ci)
ciu′′i (ci)
,− v
′
i (1− li)
(1− li) v′′i (1− li)
)
(3)
Note that Assumption 1 implies σ1i, σ2i > 0. Throughout this paper, the
ﬁnal good is chosen as the numeraire; r and w denote the real interest rate and
the real wage, respectively, while δ ∈ (0, 1) the capital depreciation rate.
Each consumer maximizes (2) with respect to (kit+1, cit, lit)∞t=0 under se-
quences of borrowing constraints kit+1 ≥ 0, positive labor supply lit ≥ 0, and
budget constraints:
cit + kit+1 − (1− δ) kit = gk (rtkit) + gl (wtlit) (4)
In equation (4), gk (rtkit) and gl (wtlit) respectively represent the after-tax
capital and labor income. We assume that these two functions have the following
properties:9
Assumption 2 The function gk (yk) : [0,+∞) → [0,+∞) (gl (yl) : [0,+∞) →
[0,+∞)) is continuous, with gk (0) = 0 (gl (0) = 0), and C2 on (0,+∞). More-
over, it satisﬁes 0 < g′k (yk) ≤ 1 (0 < g′l (yl) ≤ 1), g′′k (yk) ≤ 0 (g′′l (yl) ≤ 0)
for all yk > 0 (yl > 0), limyk→0 g′k (yk) > εk > 0 and limyl→0 g′l (yl) > εl > 0,
where both εk and εl are constant.
8This means that at least one type of households has a strictly positive endowment of
capital stock.
9To simplify the exposition, we use the notations yk ≡ rki and yl ≡ wli.
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Note that the after-tax capital (labor) income gk (yk) (gl (yl)) is increasing,
concave, and satisﬁes gk (yk) ≤ yk (gl (yl) ≤ yl). Therefore, the tax function
τk (yk) ≡ yk − gk (yk) ≥ 0 (τl (yl) ≡ yl − gl (yl) ≥ 0) is non-decreasing and
convex. Moreover, τk (yk) /yk = 1 − gk (yk) /yk and τl (yl) /yl = 1 − gl (yl) /yl
are increasing. This ensures that both taxes satisfy usual properties of marginal
and average progressivity. Notice that the ﬁscal policy we consider generalizes
Sarte (1997) and Sorger (2002) to the case where the tax rules on labor and
capital income are diﬀerent.
The elasticities of after-tax revenues are captured by:
(ρ1i, ρ2i) ≡
(
rkig
′
k (rki)
gk (rki)
,
rkig
′′
k (rki)
g′k (rki)
)
(5)
(ω1i, ω2i) ≡
(
wlig
′
l (wli)
gl (wli)
,
wlig
′′
l (wli)
g′l (wli)
)
(6)
In the elasticities of the after-tax capital income and labor income ρji and
ωji, the ﬁrst subscript denotes the order, the second one the type of individual.
Assumption 2 implies ρ1i, ω1i ∈ (0, 1] and ρ2i, ω2i ≤ 0. We further note that the
levels of |ρ2i| and |ω2i| represent measures of marginal progressivity on capital
and labor taxation, respectively.
2.2 Firms
We denote the aggregate capital and labor with Kt and Lt, and the capital-
labor ratio with kt ≡ Kt/Lt. A representative ﬁrm produces the ﬁnal good and
maximizes the proﬁt:
Yt − rtKt − wtLt
with respect to the inputs (Kt, Lt) under the technology constraint Yt = F (Kt, Lt).
The production function is characterized as follows:10
Assumption 3 F (K,L) is a continuous function deﬁned on [0,+∞)2 and
C2 on (0,+∞)2, homogeneous of degree one, strictly increasing in each argu-
ment (FK (K,L) > 0, FL (K,L) > 0) and strictly concave (FKK (K,L) < 0,
FKK (K,L)FLL (K,L) > FKL (K,L)
2). In addition, F (0, 0) = 0 and the
boundary (Inada) conditions limk→0 f ′ (k) = +∞ and limk→+∞ f ′ (k) < γ1
are satisﬁed, where f (k) ≡ F (k, 1) denotes the product per labor and k ≡ K/L
is the capital intensity.
10The following notations will hold across the paper: FXj (X) ≡ ∂F (X) /∂Xj and
FXjXh (X) ≡ ∂2F (X) / (∂Xh∂Xj), with {j, h} = {1, 2} and X ≡ (X1, X2) ≡ (K,L).
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2.3 Government
Taxes on labor and capital income are used to ﬁnance public spending Gt.
Assuming that budget is balanced at each period, we have:
Gt =
2∑
i=1
[τk (rtkit) + τl (wtlit)]ni
=
2∑
i=1
[rtkit − gk (rtkit) + wtlit − gl (wtlit)]ni (7)
Note that public expenditures neither aﬀect consumers' preferences nor the
production function.
3 Intertemporal equilibrium
We start by giving a deﬁnition of an equilibrium:
Deﬁnition 1 An equilibrium of the economy E =
(
F, gk, gl, (ki0, βi, ui, vi, ni)
2
i=1
)
is an intertemporal sequence
(
rt, wt,Kt, Lt, Yt, Gt, (kit, lit, cit)
2
i=1
)∞
t=0
which sat-
isﬁes the following conditions:
(D1) given the strictly positive sequence (rt, wt)∞t=0, (Kt, Lt) solves the ﬁrm's
program for t = 0, . . . ,∞;
(D2) given (rt, wt)∞t=0, (kit+1, cit, lit)
∞
t=0 solves the consumer's i program for
i = 1, 2;
(D3) the public spending Gt is determined by the balanced budget rule (7);
(D4) the capital market clears: Kt =
∑2
i=1 nikit for t = 0, . . . ,∞;
(D5) the labor market clears: Lt =
∑2
i=1 nilit for t = 0, . . . ,∞;
(D6) the product market clears: Yt = Gt+
∑2
i=1 [cit + kit+1 − (1− δ) kit]ni for
t = 0, . . . ,∞.
The next proposition characterizes the intertemporal equilibrium deﬁned
above:
Proposition 1 Let an economy E satisfying Assumptions 1-3. Consider the
conditions (P1)-(P8) below for t = 0, . . . ,∞ and i = 1, 2:
(P1) Kt > 0, Lt > 0, Yt = F (Kt, Lt) > 0, kit ≥ 0, 0 ≤ lit ≤ 1, cit ≥ 0;
(P2) rt = Fk (Kt, Lt) and wt = Fl (Kt, Lt);
(P3) u′i (cit) g′l (wtlit)wt ≤ v′i (1− lit), with equality when lit > 0;
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(P4) u′i (cit) ≥ βiu′i (cit+1) [1− δ + g′k (rt+1kit+1) rt+1], with equality when kit+1 >
0;
(P5) cit + kit+1 − (1− δ) kit = gk (rtkit) + gl (wtlit);
(P6) Kt =
∑2
i=1 nikit;
(P7) Lt =
∑2
i=1 nilit;
(P8) Gt = Yt −
∑2
i=1 [gk (rtkit) + gl (wtlit)]ni.
Then, if the sequence
(
rt, wt,Kt, Lt, Yt, Gt, (kit, lit, cit)
2
i=1
)∞
t=0
is a compet-
itive equilibrium, the conditions (P1)-(P8) hold. Moreover, if the sequence(
rt, wt,Kt, Lt, Yt, Gt, (kit, lit, cit)
2
i=1
)∞
t=0
satisﬁes (P1)-(P8) and the transver-
sality condition
lim
t→+∞β
t
iu
′
i (cit) kit+1 = 0 (8)
for i = 1, 2, it is an equilibrium for the economy E.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Note that, using homogeneity of degree one of the production function, the
ﬁrst order conditions for proﬁt maximization can also be written:
rt = f ′ (kt) ≡ r (kt) (9)
wt = f (kt)− ktf ′ (kt) ≡ w (kt) (10)
Using f (k) ≡ F (k, 1), we obtain the capital share in total income s (k) and
the elasticity of capital-labor substitution σ (k):
s (k) ≡ kf
′ (k)
f (k)
(11)
σ (k) ≡ [s (k)− 1] f
′ (k)
kf ′′ (k)
(12)
Then, the equilibrium prices elasticities can be deﬁned by:
(εr, εw) ≡
(
kr′ (k)
r (k)
,
kw′ (k)
w (k)
)
=
(
−1− s (k)
σ (k)
,
s (k)
σ (k)
)
(13)
Before studying steady states, we will prove that the autarkic equilibrium is
ruled out.
Proposition 2 Let an economy E satisfy Assumptions 1-3 and K0 > 0. The
intertemporal equilibrium is such that, for t = 0, ...,+∞:
(i) Kt > 0;
(ii) cit > 0, for i = 1, 2;
(iii) lit < 1, for i = 1, 2.
Proof. See the Appendix.
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4 Steady state
Using some previous results, we ﬁrst prove the following:
Lemma 1 Under Assumptions 1-3 and K0 > 0, the economy E has no autarkic
steady state. Either the most patient households (i = 1) own capital (0 <
k1 = K/n1), or all households share the capital stock (k1 > 0, k2 > 0, K =
n1k1 + n2k2). Most patient consumers always hold more capital than impatient
ones (k1 > k2).
Proof. See the Appendix.
As a direct implication, two types of steady states could exist depending
on the capital distribution: ﬁrst, steady states where only the most patient
households own capital and second, steady states where all consumers share the
capital stock. We analyze now the ﬁrst type of steady states.
Proposition 3 Under Assumptions 1-3 and K0 > 0, there exists a steady state,
with constant prices r and w, deﬁned by the following properties:
(T1) u′1 (c1) g′l (wl1)w ≤ v′1 (1− l1) and u′2 (c2) g′l (wl2)w = v′2 (1− l2), i.e.,
0 ≤ l1 < 1 and 0 < l2 < 1;
(T2) β1 [1− δ + g′k (rk1) r] = 1 ≥ β2 [1− δ + g′k (0) r], i.e., k1 > 0 and k2 = 0;
(T3) c1 = gk (rk1)− δk1 + gl (wl1) > 0 and c2 = gl (wl2) > 0 ;
(T4) K = n1k1 > 0;
(T5) L =
∑2
i=1 nili > 0;
(T6) Y = F (n1k1, L);
(T7) G = Y − gk (rk1)n1 −
∑2
i=1 gl (wli)ni.
Proof. See the Appendix.
By direct inspection of (T1), we see that when most impatient household do
not hold capital, two types of steady state can exist, depending on the fact that
most patient consumers have or not a strictly positive labor supply (l1 = 0 or
l1 > 0).
Let γi ≡ 1/βi− 1+ δ, for i = 1, 2. Condition (T2) means that the equilibria
considered in Proposition 3 are characterized by a suﬃciently low interest rate
r ≤ γ2/g′k (0). We will see in the next proposition that, on the contrary, when
the interest rate is suﬃciently high, i.e. r > γ2/g′k (0), there exists steady state
such that all the consumers hold capital. In order to prove this result, we further
assume:
Assumption 4
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(i) limyk→+∞ g′k (yk) yαk = A, where A > 0 and α ∈ (0, 1) are constant;
(ii) g′′k (yk) < 0 for all yk > 0.
Using this additional assumption, we show11:
Proposition 4 Under Assumptions 1-4, K0 > 0 and g′k (0) r > γ2, there exists
a steady state, with constant prices r and w, deﬁned by the following properties:
(S1) u′i (ci) g′l (wli)w ≤ v′i (1− li), i.e., 0 ≤ li < 1, for i = 1, 2;
(S2) 1 = βi [1− δ + g′k (rki) r], i.e., ki > 0, for i = 1, 2;
(S3) ci = gk (rki)− δki + gl (wli) > 0, for i = 1, 2;
(S4) K =
∑2
i=1 niki > 0;
(S5) L =
∑2
i=1 nili > 0;
(S6) Y = F (K,L);
(S7) G = Y −∑2i=1 [gk (rki) + gl (wli)]ni.
if the inequality n1k1 < K is satisﬁed, with K ≡ L (f ′)−1 (r), r ≡ γ2/g′k (0)
and
k1 ≡ (g′k)−1 (g′k (0) γ1/γ2) g′k (0) /γ2
Proof. See the Appendix.
Note that since L > 0 (see (S5)), at least one type of households has a
strictly positive labor supply (l1 > 0 and/or l2 > 0). Considering the case
without heterogeneity in the instantaneous utility functions, i.e. ui (ci) = u (ci)
and vi (1− li) = v (1− li) for i = 1, 2, we will explain that impatient households
always supply more labor (l2 > l1 ≥ 0).
Note ﬁrst that if l2 = 0, we have u′ (c2) g′l (0)w ≤ v′ (1), which implies
u′ (c1) g′l (0)w < v
′ (1) because k1 > k2 (see Lemma 1) and, hence, c1 > c2. In
other words, l2 = 0 implies l1 = 0, which is ruled out by Proposition 4. However,
the opposite implication does not hold, i.e. equilibria with l2 > 0 = l1, cannot
be excluded.
Suppose now that all households supply labor (li > 0 for i = 1, 2). Then,
the equality u′ (ci) g′l (wli)w = v′ (1− li) holds for i = 1, 2, where ci is given by
(S3). Taking as given the real prices r and w, one can easily prove that li is
decreasing in ki. We deduce that, when the individuals share the same utility
functions u and v, l2 > l1 ≥ 0.12
11This proposition extends the result by Sarte (1997) to the case where labor supply is
endogenous and tax rates on labor and capital incomes are diﬀerentiable.
12Obviously, this result still holds under a weak degree of heterogeneity in the felicity
functions ui and vi.
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Let us now deﬁne the impatient agents' labor supply when k2t = 0. The
consumption-leisure arbitrage of an impatient agent is given by:
u′2 (c2t) g
′
l (wtl2t)wt = v
′
2 (1− l2t) (14)
Around the steady state where workers hold no capital, the consumption of
an impatient agent is simply given by his disposable labor income, i.e. c2t =
gl (wtl2t). Using (14), we get:
u′2 (gl (wtl2t)) g
′
l (wtl2t)wt = v
′
2 (1− l2t) (15)
Because one takes into account that consumption only depends on the labor
income, this implicitly gives the labor supply as a function of the real wage,
l2t = l2 (wt). The assumptions on technology, preferences and taxation ensure
a correct deﬁnition of this function:
Lemma 2 If Assumptions 1-2 are satisﬁed, then the labor supply l2t = l2 (wt)
is a well-deﬁned function.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Diﬀerentiating (15), and using (3) and (6), we are able to determine the
impatient agents' elasticity of labor supply ε2 ≡ wl′2(w)/l2(w):
ε2 ≡
1 + ω22 − ω12σ12
ω12
σ12
− ω22 + l21−l2 1σ22
(16)
Notice that this elasticity is strictly negative under a suﬃciently weak elas-
ticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption σ12 and/or if the elasticity
of disposable labor income |ω12| is large enough.
To provide now a suﬃcient condition for the uniqueness of a steady state
characterized by k1 > 0 = k2, which applies to both the cases where l1 = 0 and
l1 > 0. For i = 1, 2, let:
ε˜i ≡ −
1
σ1i
1−s
s
γi−(1+ρ2i)δ
ρ2i
ki
ci
− Ωi
1 + 1σ2i
li
1−li − Ωi
(17)
with
Ωi ≡ 1 + ω2i − ω1i
σ1i
[
1− ki
ci
(
γi
ρ1i
− δ
)]
Corollary 1 Let λ1 ≡ n1l1/L ∈ [0, 1), λ2 ≡ n2l2/L ∈ (0, 1]. Under Assump-
tions 1-3 and K0 > 0, there exists a unique steady state, with constant prices r
and w, deﬁned by l1 ≥ 0, l2 > 0, and the properties (T1)-(T7), if the following
condition holds for all k > 0:
σ > σP1 ≡ s [εP − (λ1ε˜1 + λ2ε2)] (18)
where εP ≡ (1− s)(1 + ρ21)/(sρ21), ε2 is given by (16), and ε˜1 by (17).
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Proof. See the Appendix.
Note that in the case where patient households do not supply labor, i.e.
l1 = 0, inequality (18) applies with λ1 = 0 and λ2 = 1. We now provide a
similar result for steady state with k1 > 0 and k2 > 0.
Corollary 2 Let λi ≡ nili/L and κi ≡ nikis (r) /
∑2
j=1 njkjs (r), where kis (r) ≡
(g′k)
−1 (γi/r) /r, for i = 1, 2. Under Assumptions 1-4, K0 > 0, g′k (0) r > γ2
and n1k1 < K, there exists a unique steady state, with constant prices r and w,
deﬁned by either l1 > 0 or l2 > 0, and the properties (S1)-(S7), if the following
condition holds for all r > r:
σ > σP2 ≡ (1− s)
2∑
i=1
1 + ρ2i
ρ2i
κi − s (λ1ε˜1 + λ2ε˜2) (19)
Proof. See the Appendix.
Corollaries 1 and 2 establish the conditions for the uniqueness of the steady
state when, respectively, capital is only supplied by the most patient households
or supplied by all consumers. Obviously, as soon as these conditions are violated,
a multiplicity of solutions can emerge, keeping in mind that the number of steady
states is generically odd. Especially, this will arise if, in both cases, σ < σPj ,
j = 1, 2, at a stationary solution.13
By direct inspection of σPj , j = 1, 2, we note that marginal progressivity in
capital taxation (ρ2i < 0) plays a crucial role on the number of steady states.
Indeed, if ρ2i tends to 0, uniqueness is ensured because σPi becomes negative.14
It is also interesting to notice that endogenous labor supply has an important
impact on the uniqueness versus multiplicity. Indeed, in the case of inelastic la-
bor supply (σ2i = 0), σPj only depends on ρ2i,15 i.e. on capital taxation. Hence,
σP1 (σP2) is strictly positive only if ρ21 (at least one ρ2i, i = 1, 2) is strictly
smaller than −1. When labor supply is elastic (σ2i > 0), marginal progressivity
on labor taxation (ω2i) and the degrees of intertemporal substitution (σji) also
aﬀect the results. In particular, when the marginal progressivity of labor tax
rates is large enough, a strictly positive value of σPi can occur for ρ2i > −1. In
this case, if capital tax rate has also a suﬃciently large marginal progressivity,
σPj can take positive values not so close to 0.16
The possible existence of multiple stationary solutions matters from an in-
dividual point of view. Let us focus on steady states where both the types hold
a positive amounts of capital, i.e. k1, k2 > 0 (see Proposition 4 and Corollary
13We observe that, according to the proofs of Corollaries 1 and 2, σ can never be smaller
than σPi for all k.14Recall also that, from Assumption 4, a strictly negative value of ρ2i is needed to ensure
the existence of a steady state where all households supply a positive amount of capital.
15For σ2i = 0, we get σP1 = (1− s) (1 + 1/ρ21) and σP2 = (1− s)
∑2
i=1 (1 + 1/ρ2i)κi.16According to Corollaries 1 and 2, when ω2i tends to +∞, we obtain σP1 = 1+(1− s) /ρ21
and σP2 = 1 + (1− s)
∑2
i=1 κi/ρ2i.
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2). The steady states can be ranked according to their level of real interest
rate r. Moreover, ki ≡ kis (r) is deﬁned by (64) (see the Appendix), where
k′is (r) r/kis (r) = − (1 + 1/ρ2i). From Lemma 1, we know that k1 > k2, what-
ever the steady state and the associated level of r. However, in order to un-
derstand how wealth inequality evolves with the steady state considered, that
is how it changes in response to the interest rate r, we compute the following
diﬀerence:
k′1s (r) r
k1s (r)
− k
′
2s (r) r
k2s (r)
=
1
ρ2 (rk2)
− 1
ρ2 (rk1)
where ρ2i ≡ ρ2 (rki) by deﬁnition.17
Therefore, if the function ρ2 (rki) is increasing, the wealth inequality raises,
whereas we get the converse if ρ2 (rki) is decreasing. In other terms, wealth
inequality is larger in a steady state characterized by a larger interest rate r if
the degree of marginal progressivity |ρ2(rki)| is decreasing.
Suppose now that all households have a strictly positive labor supply. Using
(S1) and (S3), one can implicitly deﬁne li as a function of r.18 Then, one can
prove that li is increasing in r if σ1i and ρ2i are weak enough. In other words,
each individual labor supply turns out to be larger in a steady state characterized
by a higher level of real interest rate r. Unfortunately, it is diﬃcult to establish
a relationship between the diﬀerence of labor supplies and the interest rate and,
hence, provide a clear-cut conclusion on the impact of the level of the steady
state on income inequality.
5 Comparative statics
In this section, we focus on steady states where the most patient households hold
the whole capital stock and supply no labor, i.e. k1 > k2 = 0 and l2 > l1 = 0
(see Proposition 3).19 This type of equilibria is of interest because the popula-
tion endogenously splits in two classes, (patient) capitalists who hold the whole
capital stock and do not supply labor, and (impatient) workers who do not save
and are the only ones who supply labor (see also Bosi and Seegmuller (2007)).
This also provides some foundations of the models developed by Mankiw (2000),
Michel and Pestieau (1999) and Woodford (1989).20
We start by analyzing how the population sizes of patient/impatient agents
in total population aﬀect the steady state allocation. In a second part, we will
study the impact of a modiﬁcation of the level of the tax rates.
17Taxation is not ad personam and, therefore, the functional form ρ2 is type-independent
(see (5)).
18See also the proof of Corollary 2.
19Such a stationary equilibrium where a part of population is constrained by some borrowing
restrictions and consumes his current disposable income is in accordance with several empirical
results. See for instance Bacchetta and Gerlach (1997) or Cushing (1992). For a critical survey,
see Attanasio (1999).
20Note that Thibault (2005) has developed a explanation of population segmentation closely
related to ours using an overlapping generations model with heterogeneous altruistic agents.
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5.1 Eﬀects of population sizes
Recall that (T1) and (T3) in Proposition 3 implicitly deﬁne l2 as a function of k,
l2 ≡ l2 (k), with an elasticity ε2s/σ.21 Set H (k, ν) ≡ g′k [kf ′ (k) l2 (k) /ν] f ′ (k),
where ν ≡ n1/n2 denotes the relative magnitude of social classes. In line with
the proofs of Proposition 3 and Corollary 1, we obtain the steady states as
solutions of:
H (k, ν) = γ1 (20)
In particular, the steady state is unique if:
εHk ≡ k
H
∂H
∂k
= ρ21
[
1 +
s
σ
ε2 − 1 + ρ21
ρ21
1− s
σ
]
< 0 (21)
for every k > 0, or, equivalently, σ > (1− s) (1 + 1/ρ21)− sε2 = σP1 , as seen in
Corollary 1.
The population sizes n1 and n2 can aﬀect the aggregate variables in the
model. The next proposition summarizes the eﬀects on the aggregate capital
K:
Proposition 5 Under Assumptions 1-3 and K0 > 0, if εHk < 0, the following
holds:
(i) The aggregate capital K is increasing (decreasing) in the number of patient
agents n1 if σ > −sε2 (σ < −sε2), where ε2 is deﬁned by (16);
(ii) K is increasing in the number of impatient agents n2 if ρ21 > −1.
The converse holds if εHk > 0.
Proof. See the Appendix.
We study now the eﬀects on the production Y :
Proposition 6 Under Assumptions 1-3 and K0 > 0. If εHk < 0, the following
holds:
(i) Y is increasing (decreasing) in n1 if σ > −ε2 (σ < −ε2), where ε2 is
deﬁned by (16);
(ii) Y is increasing (decreasing) in n2 if σ > 1 + 1/ρ21 (σ < 1 + 1/ρ21).
If εHk > 0, we get the reverse eﬀects.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Note that when labor supply is inelastic (σ22 = 0), the critical value −ε2 be-
comes equal to zero. On the contrary, for σ22 > 0, −ε2 increases with ω12/σ12,
21See equation (69) in the proof of Corollary 1.
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and tends to 1 when this ratio tends to +∞, i.e. when the elasticity of intertem-
poral substitution in consumption σ12 tends to 0 and/or the elasticity of labor
income |ω12| tends to +∞.
Since we consider a steady state with k1 > k2 = 0 and l2 > l1 = 0, the
individual incomes of households of type 1 and 2 are respectively given by:
I1 (k, ν) ≡ gk (r (k) kl2 (k) /ν) (22)
I2 (k) ≡ gl (w (k) l2 (k)) (23)
We now analyze the inﬂuence of the population sizes n1 and n2 on these
incomes. A direct inspection of (20), (22) and (23) will persuade us that the
relative size ν is what actually matters.
Proposition 7 Under Assumptions 1-3 and K0 > 0, an increase in the rela-
tive number of patient households ν has the following eﬀect on the households'
individual income. If εHk < 0, we get:
(i) a decrease of the patient households' individual income I1;
(ii) an increase of the impatient households' individual income I2.
If εHk > 0, we get the reverse eﬀects.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Finally, we characterize the impact of population shares on the welfare eval-
uated at the steady state.
Focus ﬁrst on patient agents. For the sake of simplicity, assume the cap-
ital depreciation rate suﬃciently close to zero (δ ≈ 0). In this case, W1 =
[u1 (I1) + v1 (1)] / (1− β1) and the impact of ν on W1 is similar to that on I1
we have characterized above (point (i) of Proposition 7).
The next proposition characterizes the impact of the population shares on
the welfare of impatient agents W2 ≡ [u2 (c2) +v2 (1− l2)]/ (1− β2).
Proposition 8 Under Assumptions 1-3 and K0 > 0, an increase of the relative
number of patient households ν raises welfare W2 iﬀ εHk < 0.
Proof. See the Appendix.
5.1.1 Interpretation
In the following, we focus on the simplest case where εHk < 0, that applies
when the marginal progressivity on capital is suﬃciently weak or the elasticity
of capital-labor substitution high enough. We begin by considering the modiﬁed
golden rule H (k, ν) = γ1, which implies εHkdk/k− ρ21dν/ν = 0. Then, k has a
negative impact on the return on capital, while the relative density of capitalists
ν reduces their individual income and increases the marginal rate of taxation.
This implies a positive impact of ν on k: ρ21/εHk > 0. It is also important to
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note that the relative share of population sizes aﬀects the capital-labor ratio,
because of the marginal progressivity of the tax rule on capital income. In the
case of a ﬂat tax on capital income (ρ21 = 0), a modiﬁcation of the population
sizes does not aﬀect k.
Consider the aggregate capital stockK = n2kl2 (k). Since dK/K = dn2/n2+
(1 + ε2s/σ) dk/k, n2 has two eﬀects on K. On the one hand, n2 has a direct
positive impact, because, given the capital per worker, the aggregate capital
depends on the number of workers. On the other hand, n2 reducing the cap-
ital per worker according to dk/k = (ρ21/εHk) dν/ν and then the real wage,
has a negative impact on K if the elasticity of labor supply is not too negative
(ε2 > −σ/s). The population size of patient agents n1 has no direct eﬀect on
K, but only through k. Its impact is the same as ν, that is, the opposite one to
the previous eﬀect of n2 on k.
We focus now on the aggregate income Y = n2f (k) l2 (k), where dY/Y =
dn2/n2 + s (1 + ε2/σ) dk/k. The population size n2 still has a direct positive
impact, but now the indirect impact through k is negative iﬀ ε2 > −σ, which
remains a plausible condition, even if it is more restrictive. As above, n1 has
only an indirect eﬀect through k, which is opposite to the indirect eﬀect of n2.
Considering the individual income of a patient household I1 ≡ gk(r (k) kl2 (k)
/ν), the relative density of capitalists ν has a direct negative impact on the
(pre-tax) capital income per capitalist. However, as seen above above, ν has a
positive impact on the capital intensity k and, therefore, can positively aﬀect
r (k) kl2 (k). However, even in this case, the ﬁrst eﬀect dominates reducing the
income I1.
Consider the workers' income I2 ≡ gl (w (k) l2 (k)). The relative density of
capitalists ν has only an indirect impact on I2 through k. Since the relationship
between k and ν is positive, the eﬀect on the pre-tax labor income w (k) l2 (k) is
positive because the increase of the real wage dominates the possible decrease
of the labor supply. Note however that, without progressivity on the capital tax
rule (ρ21 = 0), the labor income is independent of the population sizes.
The impact of the income I2 on the workers' welfare measure W2 is positive,
while that of labor supply l2 is negative. The eﬀects of ν on I2 and l2, both
depend on the elasticity of labor supply ε2, but these ambiguities cancel out
each other when we compute the aggregate eﬀect of ν on W2 (see equation (81)
in the Appendix), which turns out to be positive (equation (82)).
5.2 Eﬀects of tax rates
In order to capture the eﬀects of the tax rates on the stationary allocation, we
assume that taxes have a linear speciﬁcation:
τh (yh) ≡ thyh + Th (24)
with th ∈ [0, 1), Th ≥ 0, h = k, l. Notice that yk ≡ rk1 = rkl2n2/n1, yl = wl2
and c2 = (1− tl) yl−Tl. The speciﬁcation (24) allows us to take in account either
distortionary or lump-sum taxes and implies the following disposable incomes,
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for h = k, l:
gh (yh) = (1− th) yh − Th (25)
In order to make expression (24) compatible with Assumption 2 when Th > 0,
we further assume that the linearity in taxation holds in a neighborhood of the
steady state. In any case, Th has to be suﬃciently small in order to ensure a
positive disposable income: Th < (1− th) yh. For further reference, let:
q1 ≡ (1− tk) yk − Tk(1− tk) yk ∈ (0, 1]
q2 ≡ (1− tl) yl − Tl(1− tl) yl ∈ (0, 1]
Moreover, since ω22 = 0, the elasticity of labor supply ε2 (see equation (16))
simpliﬁes to:
ε2 =
q2 − 1σ12
1
σ12
+ q2σ22
l2
1−l2
(26)
The tax rate on capital introduces a distortion in the modiﬁed golden rule,
but preserves the uniqueness of the steady state:
(1− tk) f ′ (k) = γ1 (27)
More precisely, among the ﬁscal parameters, only the proportional tax rate
tk aﬀects the capital-labor ratio and the impact is negative:
∂k
∂tk
tk
k
= − σ
1− s
tk
1− tk < 0 (28)
More explicitly, when the tax rate tk increases, the after-tax real interest
rate decreases. Therefore, to stay at the modiﬁed golden rule, the marginal
productivity should increase, which in turn implies a reduction of the capital-
labor ratio. Moreover, using (T1), (T3) of Proposition 3, equation (25) and
applying the implicit function theorem, we locally deﬁne l2 ≡ l2 (k, Tl, tl).22
Let us start by analyzing the eﬀect of taxes on the aggregate variables K and
Y . Using the fact that K = kn2l2 (k, Tl, tl), we get the following proposition:
Proposition 9 Under Assumptions 1-3, K0 > 0 and (25), the following holds:
(i) K does not depend on Tk;
(ii) K is increasing in Tl;
(iii) K is increasing (decreasing) in tk if σ < −sε2 (σ > −sε2);
(iv) K is increasing (decreasing) in tl if ε2 < 0 (ε2 > 0).
22See the Appendix for more details.
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Proof. See the Appendix.
Using Y = f (k)n2l2 (k, Tl, tl), we are able to analyze the eﬀects of taxation
on the aggregate production:
Proposition 10 Under Assumptions 1-3, K0 > 0 and (25), the following holds:
(i) Y does not depend on Tk;
(ii) Y is increasing in Tl;
(iii) Y is increasing (decreasing) in tk if σ < −ε2 (σ > −ε2);
(iv) Y is increasing (decreasing) in tl if ε2 < 0 (ε2 > 0).
Proof. See the Appendix.
We now analyze the eﬀects of the tax rules on economic variables rele-
vant at the individual level, i.e. on the income distribution and consumers'
welfare, evaluated at the steady state. As in the previous section, we de-
ﬁne I1 ≡ gk (r (k) k1) and I2 ≡ gl (w (k) l2). Using (25), we obtain I1 =
(1− tk) r (k) kl2 (k, Tl, tl)n2/n1 − Tk and I2 = (1− tl)w (k) l2 (k, Tl, tl)− Tl.
The following proposition summarizes the impact of a variation of the tax
rates on the individual income of a patient household:
Proposition 11 Under Assumptions 1-3, K0 > 0 and (25), the following holds:
(i) I1 is decreasing in Tk;
(ii) I1 is increasing in Tl;
(iii) I1 is increasing (decreasing) in tk if σ < −sε2 (σ > −sε2);
(iv) I1 is increasing (decreasing) in tl if ε2 < 0 (ε2 > 0).
Proof. See the Appendix.
We observe that, evaluated at the steady state, the welfare of a patient
household is given by W1 ≡ [u1 (c1) + v1 (1)] / (1− β1), with c1 = I1 − δK/n1.
Because W1 is increasing in c1, for a depreciation rate of capital δ suﬃciently
close to zero, the eﬀects of a modiﬁcation of tax rules on the welfare of a patient
household are also given by Proposition 11.
We now analyze the eﬀects of taxes on the individual income of an impatient
household.
Proposition 12 Under Assumptions 1-3, K0 > 0 and (25), the following holds:
(i) I2 does not depend on Tk;
(ii) I2 is decreasing in Tl, tk or tl.
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Proof. See the Appendix.
Since c2 = I2, Proposition 12 also describes the eﬀects of tax rules on the
consumption of impatient households. However, since they elastically supply
labor, the impact on their welfare W2 ≡ [u2 (c2) + v2 (1− l2)] / (1− β2) should
be analyzed more carefully. The results are summarized in the next proposition:
Proposition 13 Under Assumptions 1-3, K0 > 0 and (25), the following holds:
(i) W2 does not depend on Tk;
(ii) W2 is decreasing in Tl, tk or tl.
Proof. See the Appendix.
5.2.1 Interpretation
First, consider the impact of the lump-tax on capital Tk. Since it aﬀects only
the capitalists' after-tax income I1 and has no eﬀect on the capital-labor ratio
k, then K, Y , I2 and W2 do not depend on it, while I1 and W1 are obviously
negatively aﬀected.
Focus now on Tl. The impact on the individual labor supply l2 is positive.
Indeed, according to the expression of (Tl/l2) ∂l2/∂Tl in (83), given the real
wage, workers compensate the reduction of disposable income with a higher
labor supply. Since the eﬀects on K, Y , I1 only go through l2, we get a positive
impact of Tl. However, the impact on I2 = (1− tl)wl2−Tl is negative, because
the positive impact through l2 is dominated by the direct eﬀect −Tl. Clearly, the
eﬀect on W2 is negative: the impatient agents work more, but their disposable
income lowers.
Third, consider an increase of the distortionary tax tl. As above, the eﬀects
on K, Y , I1 only go through the labor supply l2. However, now, the impact
on the individual labor supply l2 is ambiguous, because the tax is distortionary
and a decrease in the after-tax real wage can induce agents to work less. This
happens only if the elasticity of labor supply is positive, that is, the elastic-
ity of intertemporal substitution in consumption is suﬃciently high and the
substitution eﬀect dominates the income eﬀect. Indeed, ε2 > 0 is equivalent to
σ12 > 1/q2. However, the impact on I2 = (1− tl)wl2 (k, Tl, tl)−Tl is unambigu-
ously negative because the decrease of 1 − tl always dominates the ambiguous
eﬀect of l2. Concerning the welfare of impatient agents, when ε2 > 0, the re-
duction of disposable income and, therefore, of consumption, is not completely
oﬀset by the increase of leisure, which explains that W2 decreases. A fortiori,
W2 decreases when ε2 < 0, because agents work more.
We ﬁnish by analyzing the eﬀects of an increase of tk. Only this tax
has an impact on the capital intensity k, which is negative (see (28) and its
immediate interpretation). We observe two eﬀects on the aggregate capital
K = kn2l2 (k, Tl, tl): k decreases, while, according to (83), l2 increases iﬀ ε2 < 0,
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that is σ12 < 1/q2 (when k decreases, the real wage decreases as well and la-
bor supply increases iﬀ the income eﬀect dominates the substitution eﬀect).
Therefore, a positive total impact requires a suﬃciently negative elasticity of
labor supply: ε2 < −σ/s. The mechanism is quite similar for the aggregate in-
come Y = f (k)n2l2 (k, Tl, tl), but now the condition for a total positive impact
becomes less demanding (ε2 < −σ) because of the concavity of f .
Concerning the capitalists' income I1 = (1− tk) r (k) kl2 (k, Tl, tl), the ad-
dition of several eﬀects is still ambiguous. An increase of tk lowers 1 − tk and
k, but raises the interest rare r and has on labor supply l2 the same eﬀect we
highlighted above. The lower the elasticity of capital-labor substitution σ, the
higher the response of interest rate and the lower ε2 < 0, the larger the positive
response of l2. This explains why I1 increases iﬀ σ < −sε2.
Workers' income I2 = (1− tl)w (k) l2 (k, Tl, tl) always diminishes when the
ﬁscal authority raises tk, because the decrease of k entails a fall in the real
wage, which deﬁnitely dominates the ambiguous behavior of labor supply l2.
The subsequent contraction in consumption lowers their satisfaction level, even
if they work less, and this eventually reduces W2.
6 Dynamics
In this section, we begin to study the stability properties and the occurrence of
cycles in the neighborhood of the steady state where patient consumers own the
whole capital stock (Kt = n1k1t and k2t = 0). As explained at the beginning
of Section 5, considering such a steady state is relevant from a theoretical as
well as an empirical point of view. We start by deriving the pertinent dynamic
system.
6.1 Dynamic system
The impatient agents' labor supplies have been derived from the arbitrage equa-
tion (14). Focus now on the consumption-leisure arbitrage of an agent of type
1, when labor supply is strictly positive:
u′1 (c1t) g
′
l (wtl1t)wt = v
′
1 (1− l1t) (29)
where
c1t = gk (rtk1t) + gl (wtl1t)− k1t+1 + (1− δ) k1t (30)
Substituting (30) into (29), the consumption-leisure arbitrage deﬁnes a la-
bor supply, which depends on the real wage and individual consumption l1t ≡
l1 (wt, c1t).
The following lemma ensures that this labor supply is well-deﬁned:
Lemma 3 If liml1t→0 v′1 (1− l1t) < u′1 (c1t) g′l (wtl1t)wt and Assumptions 1 and
2 are satisﬁed, then l1t = l1 (wt, cit) is a well-deﬁned function.
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Proof. See the Appendix.
For our analysis, it is also useful to derive the aggregate labor supply. Re-
calling that, around the steady state, Kt = n1k1t and using Lemma 3, (P2) and
(P7) of Proposition 3, and equations (9) and (10), we obtain:
Lt = n1l1
(
w
(
n1k1t
Lt
)
, c1t
)
+ n2l2
(
w
(
n1k1t
Lt
))
(31)
that is, an implicit equation relating the aggregate labor supply Lt to the indi-
vidual capital and consumption: Lt ≡ L (k1t, c1t). Therefore, using the notation
β ≡ β1, the condition (P4) of Proposition 3, which holds with equality for the
most patient agents in the neighborhood of the steady state, writes:
u′1 (c1t) = βu
′
1 (c1t+1) (32)[
1− δ + g′k
(
r
(
n1k1t+1
L (k1t+1, c1t+1)
)
k1t+1
)
r
(
n1k1t+1
L (k1t+1, c1t+1)
)]
while the patient agents' equilibrium budget constraint becomes:
c1t = gk
(
r
(
n1k1t
L (k1t, c1t)
)
k1t
)
(33)
+gl
(
w
(
n1k1t
L (k1t, c1t)
)
l1
(
w
(
n1k1t
L (k1t, c1t)
)
, c1t
))
− k1t+1 + (1− δ) k1t
Given the initial condition k10 > 0 and the transversality condition (8),
equations (32) and (33) constitute a two-dimensional dynamics that determines
the sequence (k1t, c1t)+∞t=0 . As usual, k1t is a predetermined variable, while
c1t jumps in order to implement an equilibrium path, which is positive and
compatible with the transversality condition.
As seen above for the impatient agents (equation (16)), we deﬁne the elas-
ticity of labor supply. More precisely, diﬀerentiating l1 = l1 (w, c1) with respect
to w, c1 and l1, and using (3) and (6) gives:
(ε1, εl1c1) ≡
(
wl1w (w, c1)
l1 (w, c1)
,
c1l1c1 (w, c1)
l1 (w, c1)
)
=
(
1 + ω21
l1
1−l1
1
σ21
− ω21
,−
1
σ11
l1
1−l1
1
σ21
− ω21
)
(34)
Eventually, diﬀerentiating L = L (k1, c1) with respect to k1, c1 and L, we get
the following elasticities:
(εLk1 , εLc1) ≡
(
k1Lk1 (k1, c1)
L (k1, c1)
,
c1Lc1 (k1, c1)
L (k1, c1)
)
=
(
εεw
1 + εεw
,
λ1εl1c1
1 + εεw
)
(35)
where ε ≡ λ1ε1 + λ2ε2 is the average elasticity of labor supply with respect to
the real wage, with weights (λ1, λ2) ≡ (n1l1/L, n2l2/L).
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6.2 Preliminaries
The issue of convergence to the steady state is now addressed through a local
analysis. To characterize the stability properties of the steady state and the
occurrence of local bifurcations, we proceed by linearizing the dynamic system
(32)-(33) around the steady state (k1, c1) deﬁned in Proposition 3 and computing
the Jacobian matrix J , evaluated at this steady state. Local dynamics are
represented by a linear system (dk1t+1/k1, dc1t+1/c1)T = J (dk1t/k1, dc1t/c1)T .
In the following, we exploit the fact that the trace T and the determinant D of
J are the sum and the product of the eigenvalues, respectively. As stressed by
Grandmont, Pintus and de Vilder (1998), the stability properties of the system,
that is, the location of the eigenvalues with respect to the unit circle, can be
quite easily characterized in the (T,D)-plane.
More explicitly, we evaluate the characteristic polynomial P (X) ≡ X2 −
TX +D at −1, 0 and 1 (see Figures 1-3). Along the line (AC), one eigenvalue
is equal to 1, i.e. P (1) = 1− T +D = 0. Along the line (AB), one eigenvalue
is equal to −1, i.e. P (−1) = 1 + T + D = 0. On the segment [BC], the
two eigenvalues are complex and conjugate with unit modulus, i.e. D = 1
and |T | < 2. Therefore, inside the triangle ABC, the steady state is a sink,
i.e. locally indeterminate (D < 1 and |T | < 1 + D). It is a saddle point if
(T,D) lies on the right sides of both (AB) and (AC) or on the left sides of
both of them (|1 +D| < |T |). It is a source otherwise. A (local) bifurcation
arises when at least one eigenvalue crosses the unit circle, that is, when the
pair (T,D) crosses one of the loci (AB), (AC) or [BC]. (T,D) depends on the
structural parameters. We choose to vary a parameter of interest and observe
how (T,D) moves in the (T,D)-plane. More precisely, according to the changes
in the bifurcation parameter, a pitchfork bifurcation (generically) occurs when
(T,D) goes through (AC),23 a ﬂip bifurcation (generically) arises when (T,D)
crosses (AB), whereas a Hopf bifurcation (generically) happens when (T,D)
goes through the segment [BC].
Taking into account (3), (5), (6), (13), (34) and (16), the linearization of
(32)-(33) gives:[
dk1t+1/k1
dc1t+1/c1
]
=
[
M1 M2
1 0
]−1 [ 0 1
M3 M4
] [
dk1t/k1
dc1t/c1
]
where
M1 ≡ γβ [B (σ) (1 + ρ21)− ρ21]σ11 (36)
M2 ≡ 1 + γβB (σ) (1 + ρ21) λ1ε11 + ω21 (37)
M3 ≡ 1
β
− γB (σ) [1− hλ1 (1 + ε1)] (38)
M4 ≡ − Z
βσ11
−B (σ) [1− hλ1 (1 + ε1)] γ
σ11
λ1ε1
1 + ω21
(39)
23A pitchfork bifurcation (instead of a saddle or a transcritical bifurcation) generically arises
because the number of steady states is generically odd.
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with
B (σ) ≡ (1− s) / (σ + sε)
h ≡ g′l (wl1) /g′k (rk1) = g′l (wl1) r/γ > 0 (40)
Z ≡ β
[
γhλ1
1− s
s
(
ε1
1 + ω21
+
σ11
ω11
)
+ σ11
(
γ
ρ11
− δ
)]
> 0
and γ ≡ 1/β − 1 + δ.
Therefore, the determinant and trace are respectively given by:
D (σ) = M3/M2 (41)
T (σ) = M3 + (1−M1M4) /M2 (42)
Despite of these complicate expressions, two simple features arise.
(1) The locus Σ ≡ {(T (σ) , D (σ)) : σ ≥ 0} obtained by varying the capital-
labor substitution in the (T,D)-plane is linear and allows us to apply the geo-
metrical method introduced by Grandmont, Pintus and de Vilder (1998).24 The
slope of Σ is given by:
S =
D′ (σ)
T ′ (σ)
=
1− hλ1 (1 + ε1) + (1 + ρ21) λ1ε11+ω21
[1− hλ1 (1 + ε1)− (1 + ρ21)Z]
(
1 + ρ21γβ λ1ε11+ω21
)
+ (1 + ρ21)β λ1ε11+ω21
(43)
(2) The endpoint of Σ is (T (+∞) , D (+∞)) = (1 + 1/β − γρ21Z, 1/β).
A ﬁrst important result we obtain in line with Becker and Foias (1987, 1994)
and Bosi and Seegmuller (2007) is that a suﬃciently high capital-labor substitu-
tion rules out the occurrence of ﬂuctuations. More precisely, without introducing
additional restrictions on the tax rules, we can prove that, under an elasticity
of capital-labor substitution high enough, not only there is no longer room for
two-period cycles, but also indeterminacy is ruled out, whatever the degree of
marginal progressivity in taxation. Formally:
Proposition 14 There exists σ∗ such that σ > σ∗ implies saddle-path stability.
Proof. See the Appendix.
6.3 Local dynamics when capitalists supply no labor
A nice outcome of heterogeneous discounting is a micro-founded endogenous
segmentation in social classes (capitalists and workers): only patient agents hold
24Becker and Foias (1994) choose the same parameter to make the bifurcation analysis,
while following a diﬀerent (non-geometrical) approach.
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capital and only impatient ones supply labor (k2 = l1 = 0). This important case
deserves a deepening of the stability properties.
Since λ1 = 0, the average elasticity of labor supply reduces to the elasticity
of impatient agents, i.e. ε = ε2, and marginal progressivity can play a role
on the dynamics only through two parameters, |ρ21| and |ω22|. Therefore, the
determinant and trace (41)-(42) simplify to:25
D (σ) =
1
β
− γ 1− s
σ + sε
(44)
T (σ) = 1 +
1
β
− γ 1− s
σ + sε
1
S
− γρ21Z (45)
where now Z = β (γ/ρ11 − δ)σ11 > 0 and the slope of the Σ-line becomes:
S =
1
1− (1 + ρ21)Z (46)
We begin the analysis by few observations (see also Figure 1). When σ is
increasing, (T (σ) , D (σ))moves on the line Σ in such a way thatD (σ) is strictly
increasing. In particular, when σ tends to +∞, one reaches the following point
in the (T,D)-plane:
D (+∞) = 1/β > 1 and T (+∞) = 1 + 1/β − γρ21Z > 1 +D (+∞) (47)
which is below the line (AC) and above the horizontal axis, i.e. in the saddle-
path region. In order to address the issue of the role of marginal progressivity
on local dynamics, it is convenient to analyze the location of the line Σ when
ρ21 decreases from 0 to −∞, that is, when the marginal progressivity on capital
taxation increases. Using (44) and (45), we can deduce that for all value of ρ21,
Σ goes through the following ﬁxed point G:
(TG, DG) = (2− δ + γZ, 1− δ) (48)
which corresponds to σ = 1 − s (1 + ε).26 Note that this ﬁxed point is located
below the line (AC) and above the horizontal axis. Since DG < 1 < D (+∞) <
T (+∞) − 1, Σ always goes on the right side of point C, which excludes any
Hopf bifurcation. Now, by direct inspection of (46) and (47), we observe that,
when ρ21 decreases, the line Σ makes a clockwise rotation around G. When ρ21
tends to 0, S = 1/ (1− Z) is strictly greater than 1 or negative. For ρ21 = −1,
we have S = 1, but Σ still lies below point A. Finally, Σ goes through A for
ρ21 = ρA,27 where:
ρA ≡ − 1 + β
β (2− δ) < −1 (49)
25Using (36)-(39), we get M1 = βγσ11 [B (σ) (1 + ρ21)− ρ21], M2 = 1, M3 = 1/β − γB (σ)
and M4 = δ − γ/ρ11 = −c1/k1.
26This ﬁxed point is obtained deriving D (σ) and T (σ) with respect to ρ21.
27In this case, we have S = 1/ [1 + Zγ/ (2− δ)] ∈ (0, 1).
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and has a slope which tends to 0 when ρ21 tends to −∞. Since DG ∈ (0, 1), Σ
goes through ABC for all ρ21 < ρA. Let:
σP ≡ s (εP − ε) (50)
σF ≡ s (εF − ε) (51)
with
εP ≡ 1− s
s
1 + ρ21
ρ21
(52)
εF ≡ 1− s
s
2βγ − (1 + ρ21)βγZ
2 (1 + β)− ρ21βγZ (53)
solving D (σP ) = T (σP )−1 and D (σF ) = −T (σF )−1, respectively. For ρ21 <
ρA, the line Σ crosses the line (AB) for a smaller value of σ than when it crosses
(AC), whereas we get the opposite conclusion (σP < σF ) for ρA < ρ21 < 0.
Using these geometrical arguments, we deduce the following proposition:
Proposition 15 Under Assumptions 1-3 and K0 > 0, a steady state charac-
terized by k1 > 0, l2 > 0 and k2 = l1 = 0 (see Proposition 3) has the following
local stability properties.
(i) When ρA < ρ21 < 0, the steady state is a saddle for 0 < σ < σP , a source
for σP < σ < σF , and a saddle for σF < σ.
(ii) When ρ21 < ρA, the steady state is a saddle for 0 < σ < σF , a sink
(indeterminate) for σF < σ < σP , and a saddle for σP < σ.
A ﬂip bifurcation generically occurs at σ = σF and a pitchfork bifurcation at
σ = σP .
In accordance with Proposition 14, saddle-path stability is ensured by a
suﬃciently high capital-labor substitution (σ > max {σF , σP }).
We further note that some conﬁgurations obtained in this proposition also
depend on the location of the starting point (T (0) , D (0)) on the line Σ, which
is measured by the level of ε = ε2 with respect to εP and εF . For instance, if
ε > εF , a ﬂip bifurcation never emerges because σF < 0 < σ. In a similar way,
if ε > εP , a pitchfork bifurcation never emerges because σP < 0 < σ.
Case (i) of the proposition states that when ρA < ρ21 < 0 and ε < εF , a
ﬂip bifurcation can occur. Therefore, even if the marginal progressivity of the
capital tax rate is not too large, endogenous cycles can occur. This does not
only require a not too large value of the capital-labor substitution, but also a
suﬃciently weak value for ε2.28 When the marginal progressivity of the capital
tax rate is suﬃciently high, not only cycles of period 2 can occur (if ε < εF ),
but also expectation-driven ﬂuctuations (if ε < εP ).
To analyze more precisely the eﬀect of marginal progressivity on macroeco-
nomic (in)stability, we need the following lemma:
28See Bosi and Seegmuller (2007) for a similar result in a less general model without taxes,
or Becker and Foias (1987, 1994) in a more speciﬁc framework with inelastic labor supply and
no taxation.
26
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A
B C
T
D
σ = +∞
σP
G
0 > ρ21 > −1
ρ21 = −1
ρ21 = ρA
ρ21 < ρA
σF
σF
σF
σP
Figure 1: Capitalists supply no labor
Lemma 4
(i) ∂σP /∂ |ω22| = ∂σF /∂ |ω22| > 0;
(ii) ∂σP /∂ |ρ21| > 0, ∂σF /∂ |ρ21| > 0;
(iii) ∂ (σP − σF ) /∂ |ρ21| > 0 iﬀ
ρ21 > −2 (1 + β) /β2− δ or γZ <
2 (1 + β)2 / (βρ21)
2
2− δ + 2 (1 + β) / (βρ21)
Proof. See the Appendix.
This lemma implies two corollaries about the role of progressivity in the
occurrence of deterministic and stochastic endogenous ﬂuctuations.
Corollary 3 Marginal progressivity in taxation promotes the occurrence of per-
sistent cycles.
27
This corollary can be explained as follows. Recall that endogenous cycles
generically occur when σ crosses the critical value σF . Then, on the one hand,
if σF < 0 (that is ε > εF ), increasing the progressivity measures |ρ21| or |ω22|
can make the interval (0, σF ) non-empty. On the other hand, if 0 < σF , raising
|ρ21| or |ω22| widens (0, σF ), making cycles more likely, because they generically
occur for a higher degree of capital-labor substitution.
We now analyze the role of marginal progressivity on local indeterminacy:
Corollary 4 Under ρ21 < ρA (or, equivalently, εF < εP ) and the assumption
of Lemma 4, marginal progressivity in taxation promotes indeterminacy.
To explain this corollary, assume ﬁrst that σF < 0 (that is ε > εF ) and
recall that indeterminacy occurs for σ that belongs to (σF , σP ). On the one
hand, a larger marginal progressivity, measured by |ρ21| or |ω22|, can either
make the interval (0, σP ) nonempty, or widen it. On the other hand, under
the assumptions of Lemma 4, when σF > 0 (that is ε < εF ), the extent of the
indeterminacy range (σP −σF ) is invariant w.r.t. the marginal progressivity on
labor, but widens with the marginal progressivity on capital.
Hence, this section shows that in contrast to several existing results, pro-
gressive tax rules do not play a stabilizing role, but rather promote endoge-
nous cycles and expectation-driven ﬂuctuations. Especially, we have seen that
marginal progressivity in capital taxation plays a key role on the occurrence of
indeterminacy.
Still considering the case where the capital stock is held by the most patient
households, we aim at analyzing further the role of progressivity in labor income
taxation.
To this purpose, we introduce a ﬂat tax on capital income, but we generalize
the analysis to the case where both the types of agents supply a positive amount
of labor. In such a framework, we will be able to study the role on dynamics of
labor tax rates that also aﬀect the most patient agents' wage earnings.
6.4 Local dynamics under a ﬂat tax on capital income
Assuming a ﬂat tax on capital income, we have τk (rtk1t) = rtk1t − gk (rtk1t) ≡
tkrtk1t+Tk, with tk ∈ [0, 1). Therefore, we have gk (rtk1t) ≡ (1− tk) rtk1t−Tk
and ρ21 = 0.29 Focusing on dynamics in a neighborhood of a steady state with
k1 > 0, l1 > 0, l2 > 0 and k2 = 0, and using equations (41)-(43), the trace
T (σ), the determinant D (σ) and the slope S simplify to:
T (σ) =
1
β
+
1 + γB (σ)Z − γB (σ) [1− hλ1 (1 + ε1)]
1 + γβB (σ) λ1ε11+ω21
(54)
D (σ) = T (σ)− 1−
[
Z + (1− β) λ1ε1
1 + ω21
]
γB (σ)
1 + γβB (σ) λ1ε11+ω21
(55)
S =
H
H − Z − (1− β) λ1ε11+ω21
(56)
29Note that, when Tk = 0, we further have ρ11 = 1.
28
with H ≡ 1− hλ1 (1 + ε1) + λ1ε1/ (1 + ω21).
We start the analysis by noting that when σ tends to +∞, the line Σ crosses
(AC) above C. Indeed, we have D (+∞) = 1/β > 1 and T (+∞) = 1 + 1/β =
1+D (+∞). Therefore, a pitchfork bifurcation can never occur. In accordance
with Corollary 1, the steady state is unique when ρ21 = 0.
By direct inspection of (56), we further notice that two main conﬁgurations
may emerge, depending on the sign of H:
(i) if H > 0, we have S > 1 or S < 0 and D′ (σ) > 0;
(ii) if H < 0, we have 0 < S < 1 and D′ (σ) < 0.
Let h∗ ≡ (1 + l1/ [(1− l1)σ21])−1 ∈ (0, 1). Using (34), the inequality H < 0
can be rewritten ω21 > ω21, with ω21 ≡ (h− h)λ1/h∗ and h ≡ [1− (1− λ1)h∗] /λ1 >
1.
Therefore, conﬁguration (i) applies iﬀ 0 < h < h or ω21 < ω21, whereas
conﬁguration (ii) holds iﬀ h > h and ω21 < ω21 < 0.
Focus ﬁrst on conﬁguration (i) (see also Figure 2).30 Since (T (+∞) , D (+∞))
is on the line (AC) above C, D (σ) is strictly increasing and the slope S does
not belong to (0, 1), we geometrically see that Σ can never goes through ABC
and can only crosses the line (AB).31 Let us deﬁne σF ≡ s (εF − ε), with:
εF ≡ βγ 1− s
s
[
1− hλ1 (1 + ε1)− Z/2
1 + β
− 1
2
λ1ε1
1 + ω21
]
(57)
that solves D (σ) = −T (σ) − 1. By continuity, (T (σ) , D (σ)) is always in the
saddle region for σ > σF , whereas the steady state is a source for σ < σF . We
observe that this last case also requires ε < εF , because otherwise σF < 0.
Consider now conﬁguration (ii) (see also Figure 3). Since (T (+∞) , D (+∞))
is on the line (AC) above C, D(σ) is strictly decreasing and the slope S belongs
to (0, 1), Σ can go through the triangle ABC. To clearly identify the conditions
such that this really occurs, we need the following lemma:
Lemma 5 For h > h, the slope S is strictly increasing in ω21.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Therefore, for h > h, the line Σ makes a clockwise rotation around the ﬁxed
point (T (+∞) , D (+∞)) when ω21 decreases from 0 to ω21, i.e. the slope S
decreases from a value between 0 and 1 to 0 in the limit case where ω21 = ω21.
In the following, we deﬁne ω∗21 as the critical value of ω21 such that the line Σ
goes through the point B:
ω∗21 ≡
1− h∗
h∗
− λ1
h∗
h
[
4− (1− β)h∗γ 1−ss
]− h∗ (1+β)2β
4 + σ11 (1− β)
(
γ
ρ11
− δ + λ1h γω11 1−ss
)
30Note that Figure 2 is drawn for S < −1, but ﬁgures representing similar qualitative results
should be done for S > 1 and −1 < S < 0.
31The locus Σ crosses (AB) below A if |S| > 1 or above B if −1 < S < 0. See also Bosi and
Seegmuller (2007) who obtain similar geometrical representations in a model without taxation.
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Clearly, when ω∗21 ≥ 0, Σ lies above B for all ω21 ∈ (ω21, 0), while when
ω∗21 < 0, Σ lies above B for ω21 ∈ (ω21, ω∗21) and below B for ω21 ∈ (ω∗21, 0). In
this last case, the critical value σH ≡ s (εH − ε), deﬁned by D (σ) = 1, with
εH ≡ βγ 1− s
s
[
1− hλ1 (1 + ε1)
1− β +
β
1− β
λ1ε1
1 + ω21
]
corresponds to the lower bound of σ for indeterminacy to occur.32 Using all
these geometrical arguments, we deduce the next proposition:
Proposition 16 Under Assumptions 1-3 and K0 > 0, a steady state character-
ized by k1 > 0, l1 > 0, l2 > 0 and k2 = 0 (see Proposition 3) has the following
local stability properties.
(i) When 0 < h < h or (h > h and ω21 < ω∗21), the steady state is a source for
0 < σ < σF and a saddle for σF < σ.
(ii) When h > h and ω∗21 < ω21 < 0, the steady state is a source for 0 < σ < σH ,
a sink (indeterminate) for σH < σ < σF , and a saddle for σ > σF .
A ﬂip bifurcation generically occurs at σ = σF and a Hopf bifurcation at
σ = σH .
This proposition shows that if ε < εF , endogenous cycles of period 2 can
emerge. Recalling ε = λ1ε1 + λ2ε2, this requires a suﬃciently small value of
ε2, ensured for instance by a suﬃciently weak elasticity of intertemporal sub-
stitution in consumption σ12. Note that the occurrence of a Hopf bifurcation
requires even a smaller elasticity ε2.33 Surprisingly, indeterminacy emerges
only if marginal progressivity on labor income of patient households is not
too large (ω21 > ω∗21). However, it also requires h > h, i.e., using h =
[1− τ ′l (ωl1)] / (1− tk) (see (40)), a suﬃciently large distortionary tax rate on
capital income tk > 1 − [1− τ ′l (wl1)] /h. In other words, expectations-driven
ﬂuctuations appear if the net income of patient consumers gl (wl1) + gk (rk1)
depends little on capital income. It is also interesting to notice that in con-
ﬁguration (ii) of the proposition, because we have H < 0, we can deduce that
εF < 0. Therefore, if the average elasticity of labor supply ε is positive, we
obtain σF < 0, that is, the steady state is a saddle for all σ > 0.
Now, to further investigate the role of progressivity on macroeconomic (in)sta-
bility, the following results are needed:
Lemma 6
(i) ∂σH/∂ |ω22| = ∂σF /∂ |ω22| > 0.
(ii) ∂σF /∂ |ω21| > 0.
32By direct inspection of the expression of σH , we see that it is strictly positive if and only
if ε < εH .33Indeed, in conﬁguration (ii) of Proposition 16, we have εH < εF .
30
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Figure 2: Flat tax on capital income with S < −1
(iii) h > h implies ∂σH/∂ |ω21| > 0.
(iv) ω∗21 < 0 implies ∂ (σF − σH) /∂ |ω21| < 0.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Using this lemma, we are now able to study how progressivity aﬀects the
occurrence of endogenous cycles and local indeterminacy.
Corollary 5 Progressivity in labor income taxation promotes the occurrence of
persistent cycles.
According to Lemma 6, a higher marginal progressivity, through an increase
of |ω21| or |ω22| raises the two critical values σF and σH . In case (i) of Propo-
sition 16, both the progressivities |ω21| and |ω22| either make σF positive and
nonempty the interval (0, σF ) where two-period cycles arise, or enlarge the in-
terval (0, σF ). In case (ii) of Proposition 16, the range (0, σH) for limit cycles
also widens.
31
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Figure 3: Flat tax on capital income with 0 < S < 1
Corollary 6 Assume h > h and ω∗21 < ω21 < 0.
(i) When ε > εH , increasing progressivity in the labor tax rules promotes inde-
terminacy.
(ii) When ε ≤ εH , increasing progressivity for patient households promotes de-
terminacy, whereas indeterminacy occurs for higher elasticities of capital-
labor substitution under a higher progressivity for impatient households.
To explain this corollary, consider ﬁrst case (i) where σH < 0. Progressivity
promotes indeterminacy because, according to points (i) and (ii) of Lemma 6, an
increase of |ω21| or |ω22| either makes the indeterminacy range (0, σF ) nonempty
or enlarges it. In case (ii) of Corollary 6, the result comes from the fact that,
according to point (iv) of Lemma 6, an increase of |ω21| reduces the amplitude
of the indeterminacy interval (σH , σF )34 and, according to point (i) of Lemma 6,
34This should also be seen using geometrical arguments. Indeed, we have 0 < S < 1 and Σ
makes a clockwise rotation around (T (∞) , D (∞)) when |ω21| increases from 0. In particular,
when |ω21| tends to
∣∣ω∗21∣∣, Σ reaches the point B and σH converges to σF .
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an increase of |ω22| raises both σH and σF , while keeping the diﬀerence σF −σH
as constant.
6.5 Interpretation
To give an economic intuition for the occurrence of endogenous cycles and
expectation-driven ﬂuctuations, recall that the dynamics are governed by the
two following equations:
c1t + k1t+1 − (1− δ) k1t = Ikt + Ilt (58)
u′1 (c1t) = βRt+1u
′
1 (c1t+1) (59)
where on the one hand, Ikt ≡ gk (rtk1t) and Ilt ≡ gl (wtl1t) are the capitalists'
after-tax capital and labor incomes, respectively, and on the other hand, Rt+1 ≡
1− δ + g′k (rt+1k1t+1) rt+1 represents the after-tax real interest factor.
We start by focusing on the case where capitalists supply no labor, i.e.
Ilt = 0. We have shown that when the marginal progressivity on capital income
is not too large (ρ21 > ρA), cycles of period 2 may emerge (see Proposition 15).
To provide an intuition for this phenomena, related to Becker and Foias (1987,
1994) and Bosi and Seegmuller (2007), we note that:35
∂Ikt
∂k1t
k1t
Ikt
= ρ11
σ − [1− s (1 + ε)]
σ + sε
< 0 iﬀ − sε < σ < 1− s (1 + ε) (60)
In this case, when k1t decreases w.r.t. its steady state value, Ikt increases.
According to the budget constraint (58), this entails that k1t+1 goes up as
well, provided that c1t is not subject to strong intertemporal arbitrages. More
precisely, when the marginal progressivity on capital income is not too large,
c1t is little sensitive if the intertemporal substitution in consumption σ11 is
suﬃciently weak.36 Then, k1t successively moves down and up through time,
i.e. non-monotonic trajectories and endogenous cycles occur.
By direct inspection of inequality (60), we see that a lower value of ε pro-
motes oscillations, the interval of σ becoming compatible with positive and
larger values of the capital-labor substitution. In particular, since ε = ε2 and
∂ε2/∂ω22 > 0, this happens when the marginal progressivity on labor income
|ω22| is higher.
When the marginal progressivity on capital income is suﬃciently large (ρ21 <
ρA < −1), there is room for indeterminacy and expectations-driven ﬂuctuations.
First, observe that, if ρ21 < −1,
∂Rt+1
∂k1t+1
k1t+1
Rt+1
= βγ |ρ21| σP − σ
σ + sε
> 0 iﬀ − sε < σ < σP (61)
35Note that σ = −sε corresponds to the case where the trace T (σ) and the determinant
D (σ) cross both ±∞.
36Indeed, we notice that, if σ11 tends to +∞, according to equation (53), εF tends to
(1− s) (1 + ρ21) / (sρ21) and σF is no longer positive when |ρ21| becomes suﬃciently weak.
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Then, optimistic expectations on the future real interest factor Rt+1 are
compatible with higher investment, higher future consumption c1t+1 and/or a
smaller current consumption c1t, and support the oscillations explained above.
Consider now that all agents have a positive labor supply, but there is a ﬂat
tax on capital income. Hence, to simplify, we assume that Ikt = (1− tk) rtk1t,
which implies that ρ11 = 1 and ρ21 = 0. When h < h,37 the eﬀect of Ikt on the
budget constraint (58) is greater than that of Ilt. In such a case, the channel
of inequality (60) works (with ρ11 = 1) and there is room for cycles of period
2, as explained above. In addition, an increase of either |ω21| or |ω22| promotes
cycles, reducing ε = λ1ε1 + λ2ε2.
When h > h, the impact of the labor income Ilt on the budget constraint
(58) prevails w.r.t. that of Ikt. We further have:
∂Ilt
∂k1t
k1t
Ilt
= ω11 (1 + ε1)
s
σ + sε
< 0 iﬀ σ < −sε (62)
When condition (62) holds, following a negative deviation of k1t from its
steady state value, Ilt raises and k1t+1 moves also up, provided that consump-
tion is little sensitive. The condition σ < −sε being in accordance with the
ﬁndings of Proposition 16 (ii),38 this explains the emergence of oscillations.
Since indeterminacy can occur, ﬂuctuations should be driven by expectations.
To explain this phenomena, note that:
∂Rt+1
∂k1t+1
k1t+1
Rt+1
= −βγ 1− s
σ + sε
> 0 iﬀ σ < −sε (63)
Therefore, from equation (59), optimistic expectations on the future real
interest factor are sustained by a higher investment, a smaller current consump-
tion and/or a higher future consumption,39 that are in accordance with the
occurrence of the non-monotonic trajectories explained above.
7 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we analyze the eﬀects of progressive taxation on the allocations of
steady state and the local dynamics in a Ramsey economy with heterogeneous
households and borrowing constraints. Because labor supply is endogenous,
considering diﬀerent taxes on labor and capital income matters.
For simplicity, we have considered a population of only two kinds of agents.
We show that, at a steady state, the level of real interest rate determines whether
only patient consumers hold capital or both types of agents have positive savings.
Moreover, it is not always optimal for any households to supply labor.
37This is ensured by tk suﬃciently small and τ ′l (wtl1t) high enough.38Indeed, we have σH < σF < −sε.39Note that when σ < −sε, an increase of c1t+1 raises Rt+1, but this eﬀect can be considered
as negligible with regard to its negative impact on u′1 (c1t+1).
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Focusing on the steady state where only patient households save through
capital and only impatient supply labor, we characterize the eﬀects of the pop-
ulation sizes of both types of households and the eﬀects of the tax rates on
aggregate variables (capital, production), as well as on individual incomes and
welfare. We show that not only progressivity, but also endogenous labor cru-
cially matters.
Dynamics are studied through a local analysis, in a neighborhood of the
steady state where patient consumers hold all the capital stock. We show that
in most of the cases, increasing marginal progressivity promotes the existence
of endogenous cycles and indeterminacy, i.e. expectations-driven ﬂuctuations.
This result is in contrast to most of the existing contributions on one-sector
economies and is mainly explained by the existence of a market incompleteness,
due to the borrowing constraints. In any case, this paper shows that policy mak-
ers have to handle carefully the progressivity leverage to avoid macroeconomic
instability.
8 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
Necessity. Conditions (P1), (P6) and (P7) directly come from the deﬁnition of
an equilibrium. (P2) corresponds to the ﬁrst order condition of proﬁt maxi-
mization of the representative ﬁrm. (P3) and (P4) are the ﬁrst order conditions
of the utility maximization of an household i, while (P5) represents his budget
constraint. Finally, (P8) is the balanced budget rule.
Suﬃciency. To establish (D1), note ﬁrst that the strict positivity of prices
(rt, wt)
∞
t=0 is ensured by (P2) and Assumption 3. Second, for every alternative
pair
(
K˜t, L˜t
)
6= (Kt, Lt), we have:
F (Kt, Lt)− wtLt − rtKt −
[
F
(
K˜t, L˜t
)
− wtL˜t − rtK˜t
]
= F (Kt, Lt)− F
(
K˜t, L˜t
)
− rt
(
Kt − K˜t
)
− wt
(
Lt − L˜t
)
≥ Fk (Kt, Lt)
(
Kt − K˜t
)
+ Fl (Kt, Lt)
(
Lt − L˜t
)
− rt
(
Kt − K˜t
)
− wt
(
Lt − L˜t
)
= 0
Consider now a sequence
(
k˜it, l˜it, c˜it
)
satisfying the constraints in the con-
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sumer's program and the initial condition k˜i0 = ki0. We have:
∞∑
t=0
βti [ui (cit) + vi (1− lit)]−
∞∑
t=0
βti
[
ui (c˜it) + vi
(
1− l˜it
)]
=
∞∑
t=0
βti
[
ui (cit)− ui (c˜it) + vi (1− lit)− vi
(
1− l˜it
)]
≥
∞∑
t=0
βti
[
u′i (cit) (cit − c˜it)− v′i (1− lit)
(
lit − l˜it
)]
=
∞∑
t=0
βti
(
u′i (cit)
[
(1− δ)
(
kit − k˜it
)
−
(
kit+1 − k˜it+1
)
+ gk (rtkit)− gk
(
rtk˜it
)
+ gl (wtlit)− gl
(
wt l˜it
)]
− v′i (1− lit)
(
lit − l˜it
))
≥
∞∑
t=0
βti
[
u′i(cit)
(
[(1− δ) + g′k (rtkit) rt]
(
kit − k˜it
)
−
(
kit+1 − k˜it+1
))
+ [u′i (cit) g
′
l (wtlit)wt − v′i (1− lit)]
(
lit − l˜it
))
= lim
T→+∞
(
u′i (ci0) [1− δ + g′k (r0ki0) r0]
(
ki0 − k˜i0
)
+
T−1∑
t=0
βt+1i u
′
i (cit+1) [1− δ + g′k (rt+1kit+1) rt+1]
(
kit+1 − k˜it+1
)
−
T−1∑
t=0
βtiu
′
i (cit)
(
kit+1 − k˜it+1
)
− βTi u′i (ciT )
(
kiT+1 − k˜iT+1
)
+
T∑
t=0
βti [u
′
i (cit) g
′
l (wtlit)wt − v′i (1− lit)]
(
lit − l˜it
))
= lim
T→+∞
(
T−1∑
t=0
βti (βiu
′
i (cit+1) [1− δ + g′k (rt+1kit+1) rt+1]− u′i (cit))
(
kit+1 − k˜it+1
)
−βTi u′i (ciT )
(
kiT+1 − k˜iT+1
)
+
T∑
t=0
βti [u
′
i (cit) g
′
l (wtlit)wt − v′i (1− lit)]
(
lit − l˜it
))
≥ lim
T→+∞
(
T−1∑
t=0
βti (βiu
′
i (cit+1) [1− δ + g′k (rt+1kit+1) rt+1]− u′i (cit)) kit+1
− βTi u′i (ciT ) kiT+1 +
T∑
t=0
βti [u
′
i (cit) g
′
l (wtlit)wt − v′i (1− lit)] lit
)
= 0
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This proves that condition (D2) holds. (D3) is ensured by (P1), (P2) and (P8).
(D4) and (D5) are obviously obtained from (P6) and (P7), while we deduce
(D6) using (P5) and (P8).
Proof of Proposition 2
(i) For t = t0, assume Kt0 > 0 and Kt0+1 = 0. Then, kit0+1 = 0 for i = 1, 2.
From (P5) of Proposition 1, we get cit0 = gk (rt0kit0)+ (1− δ) kit0 + gl (wt0 lit0).
Obviously, cit0 > 0 for kit0 > 0. If kit0 = 0, lit0 = 0 implies cit0 = 0, which is
ruled out by (P3) of Proposition 1. Therefore, we always have cit0 > 0.
We deduce that the left-hand side of the Euler condition (P4) of Proposition
1 has a positive and ﬁnite value. Using Assumptions 1 and 3, we have both
cit0+1 > 0 and Kt0+1 > 0, which leads a contradiction. Hence, Kt0 > 0 implies
Kt0+1 > 0. Since K0 > 0, we have Kt > 0 for all t ≥ 0, by induction.
(ii) For an household i, consider an optimal sequence (cit, kit, lit)t≥0 such that,
without loss of generality, cit1 = 0 and cit1+1 > 0 for some t1. Let ε > 0 and
consider the alternative sequence
(
c˜it, k˜it, l˜it
)
t≥0
, such that:
• l˜it = lit for all t;
• k˜it1+1 = kit1+1 − ε and k˜it = kit for all t 6= t1 + 1;
• c˜it = cit for all t 6= t1, t1 + 1, c˜it1 = ε > 0, and
c˜it1+1 = cit1+1 − (1− δ) ε+ gk
(
rt1+1k˜it1+1
)
− gk (rt1+1kit1+1)
Note that c˜it1+1 and k˜it1+1 are both positive for a suﬃciently small ε. More-
over, both the sequences satisfy the sequence of budget constraints (P5).
Comparing the welfare for these two sequences, we show now that (cit, kit, lit)t≥0
is no longer optimal:
∞∑
t=0
βti
[
ui (c˜it) + vi
(
1− l˜it
)]
−
∞∑
t=0
βti [ui (cit) + vi (1− lit)]
= βt1i [ui (c˜it1)− ui (cit1)] + βt1+1i [ui (c˜it1+1)− ui (cit1+1)]
> βt1i [u
′
i (c˜it1) (c˜it1 − cit1) + βiu′i (c˜it1+1) (c˜it1+1 − cit1+1)]
= βt1i
(
u′i (ε) ε+ βiu
′
i (c˜it1+1)
[
− (1− δ) ε+ gk
(
rt1+1k˜it1+1
)
− gk (rt1+1kit1+1)
])
≥ βt1i
(
u′i (ε)− βiu′i (c˜it1+1)
[
1− δ + g′k
(
rt1+1k˜it1+1
)
rt1+1
])
ε
For ε suﬃciently close to 0, the last expression is strictly positive and cit = 0
cannot be an optimal choice for a household i. We deduce that cit > 0 for all
t = 0, ...,+∞ and i = 1, 2.
(iii) For lit > 0, the following equality holds: u′i (cit) g′l (wtlit)wt = v′i (1− lit).
Because cit > 0, we get lit < 1, by Assumption 1.
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Proof of Lemma 1
An autarkic steady state requires K = 0. However, from Proposition 2, all
stationary solutions are characterized by K > 0, which excludes the existence
of an autarkic steady state.
Since K > 0, we deduce that ki > 0 for i = 1 and/or i = 2. We further
have β1 [1− δ + g′k (0) r] > β2 [1− δ + g′k (0) r] and an agent i will hold capital
if βi [1− δ + g′k (0) r] > 1. Using these two inequalities, we easily conclude that
either only households of type 1 or all consumers hold capital.
When k2 = 0, we obviously have k1 > k2. When k1 and k2 are both
strictly positive, the following equalities are satisﬁed: β1 [1− δ + g′k (rk1) r] =
β2 [1− δ + g′k (rk2) r] = 1. Because β1 > β2 and gk is concave, we also obtain
k1 > k2.
Proof of Proposition 3
The proof of this proposition consists of three steps.
Step 1. Using Proposition 1, we notice that, for households i = 1, (T1), (T2) and
(T3) are optimal conditions. Moreover, since c1 > 0 and k1 > 0 are constant,
and 0 < β1 < 1, the transversality condition (8) holds.
Step 2. For households i = 2, consider the feasible sequence
(
k˜2t+1, l˜2t, c˜2t
)∞
t=0
,
with the initial condition k˜20 = 0. We now compare this path with the stationary
solution (k2, l2, c2)∞t=0, such that k2 = 0, 1 > l2 > 0 and c2 = gl(wl2), and show
that the stationary solution is optimal. We have:
∞∑
t=0
βt2
[
u2 (c2) + v2 (1− l2)−
(
u2 (c˜2t) + v2
(
1− l˜2t
))]
=
∞∑
t=0
βt2
[
u2 (gl(wl2))− u2 (c˜2t) + v2 (1− l2)− v2
(
1− l˜2t
)]
≥
∞∑
t=0
βt2
[
u′2 (gl(wl2)) (gl(wl2)− c˜2t)− v′2 (1− l2)
(
l2 − l˜2t
)]
=
∞∑
t=0
βt2u
′
2 (gl(wl2))
[
gl(wl2)− g′l(wl2)w
(
l2 − l˜2t
)
− c˜2t
]
= u′2 (gl(wl2))
∞∑
t=0
βt2
[
k˜2t+1 − (1− δ)k˜2t − gk(rtk˜2t)
+gl(wl2)− gl(wl˜2t)− g′l(wl2)w
(
l2 − l˜2t
)]
≥ u′2 (gl(wl2))
∞∑
t=0
βt2
[
k˜2t+1 − (1− δ)k˜2t − gk(rtk˜2t)
]
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= u′2 (gl(wl2)) lim
T→+∞
[
βT2 k˜2T+1 −
(
(1− δ)k˜20 + gk(rk˜20)
)
+
T∑
t=1
βt2
(
k˜2t/β2 − (1− δ)k˜2t − gk(rk˜2t)
)]
≥ u′2 (gl(wl2)) lim
T→+∞
T∑
t=1
βt2 [γ2 − g′k(0)r] k˜2t ≥ 0
Step 3. From the previous steps, note ﬁrst that L = n1l1+n2l2 ≥ n2l2 > 0. From
1 ≥ β2 [1− δ + g′k (0) r] and the concavity of gk, households of type i = 2 hold no
capital holding at this steady state, i.e., k2 = 0. Therefore, we have K = n1k1
and r = f ′ (n1k1/L), where k1 is the solution of g′k [f ′ (n1k1/L) k1] f ′ (n1k1/L) =
γ1.
Using Assumptions 2 and 3, there exists a solution to this equation. We
further note that neither g′k (rk1) r > γ1, nor g′k (rk1) r < γ1 can be a stationary
solution. In the ﬁrst case, it is optimal for patient consumers to accumulate
more capital whereas, in the second case, they would decumulate to zero.
Proof of Proposition 4
The proof of this proposition consists of three steps.
Step 1. Using Proposition 1, we notice that, for all households (i = 1, 2), (S1),
(S2) and (S3) are optimal conditions. Moreover, since ci > 0 and ki > 0 are
constant, and 0 < βi < 1, the transversality condition (8) holds, for i = 1, 2.
Step 2. To prove that L > 0, we consider two cases.
- Case 1: F (K, 0) = 0. After noticing that L = 0 not only implies l1 = l2 =
0, but also Y = 0, we deduce that ci = 0, for i = 1, 2, which violates Proposition
2 and leads to a contradiction.
- Case 2: F (K, 0) > 0. In this case, we have ci = gk (rki) − δki > 0,
i.e., u′i (ci) has a ﬁnite value and (S2) applies. First, notice that equilibria
such that K = 0 are ruled out by Proposition 2. Conversely, if K > 0, then,
limL→0+ K/L = +∞ and, under Assumption 3, we get limL→0+ f ′ (k) < γi, for
i = 1, 2. Since 0 < g′k (yk) ≤ 1 (see Assumption 2), (S2) is no longer satisﬁed,
leading to a contradiction.
This step also proves that there exists L > 0 such that L > L.
Step 3. According to the second step, we can set L > 0 in order to prove that
there exists a stationary solution (K, r).
First, notice that the steady state value ki is deﬁned by the equality (S2),
for i = 1, 2. Assumption 4 implies limyk→+∞ g′k (yk) = 0. Since we assume
g′k (0) r > γ2 > γ1, there exist positive values k1 and k2 satisfying (S2), for
i = 1, 2. Furthermore, under Assumption 4, g′k is invertible and, according to
(S2), ki can be computed as a function of r:
kis (r) ≡ (g′k)−1 (γi/r) /r (64)
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Moreover, since g′k(0)r > γ2, r belongs to (r,+∞), with:
r ≡ γ2/g′k (0) (65)
Since limyk→+∞
∣∣g′k (yk)−Ay−αk ∣∣ = 0, limxk→0+ ∣∣∣(g′k)−1 (xk)− (A/xk)1/α∣∣∣ =
0. Using (64), we obtain: limr→+∞ kis (r) = limr→+∞
(
Ar1−α/γi
)1/α = +∞.
Using again (64), we get also: limr→r kis (r) = (g′k)
−1 (g′k (0) γi/γ2) g
′
k (0) /γ2.
More precisely, we have limr→r k2s (r) = 0 and k1 ≡ limr→r k1s (r) > 0. Hence,
deﬁningKs (r) ≡ n1k1s (r)+n2k2s (r) the aggregate supply of capital, we deduce
that:
lim
r→rKs (r) = n1k1 > 0 and limr→+∞Ks (r) = +∞ (66)
Note now that the equation r = f ′ (K/L) implicitly deﬁnes the aggregate
capital demand Kd (r) ≡ Lf ′−1 (r). Since f is concave, Kd (r) is decreasing.
Moreover, using Assumption 3, we have:
lim
r→+∞Kd (r) = 0 (67)
Using again Assumption 3, we notice that when K increases from 0 to +∞,
r decreases from +∞ to limk→+∞ f ′ (k) < γ1, which is strictly smaller than r.
Therefore, there exists Kd (r) = f ′−1 (r), with Kd (r) > K ≡ Lf ′−1 (r).
From these last results and (66), there exists a solution (K, r) to the equation
Ks (r) = Kd (r), which determines the existence of a stationary equilibrium, if
the condition n1k1 < K is satisﬁed.
Proof of Lemma 2 We want to prove that the solution l2t = l2 (wt) of the
implicit equation (15) is a well-deﬁned function. Since (15) is a static arbitrage,
we omit the time subscripts. Equation (15) is equivalent to:
ϕ2 (w, l2) = w (68)
where ϕ2 (w, l2) ≡ v′2 (1− l2) / [u′2 (gl (wl2)) g′l (wl2)]. The partial elasticity of
ϕ2 w.r.t. l2 is
∂ϕ2
∂l2
l2
ϕ2
=
l2
1− l2
1
σ22
+
ω12
σ12
− ω22 > 0
because σ12 > 0, σ22 > 0, ω12 ∈ (0, 1] and ω22 ≤ 0 (Assumptions 1 and
2). Then, ϕ2 is a continuous and strictly increasing function in l2. Given w,
we have, under Assumption 1 (Inada conditions), liml2→0+ ϕ2 (w, l2) = 0 and
liml2→1− ϕ2 (w, l2) = +∞. Hence, ϕ2 crosses w once and only once. In other
terms, the solution of equation (68) exists and is unique, ensuring that l2 (w) is
a well-deﬁned function.
Proof of Corollary 1
Since we focus on steady states where k1 > 0, k2 = 0, l1 ≥ 0 and l2 > 0, we
have k = K/L with K = n1k1 and L = n1l1 + n2l2 ≥ n2l2.
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Using Proposition 3, notice that (T1) and (T3) implicitly deﬁne l2 as a
function of k, l2 (k), with:
dl2
dk
k
l2
=
s
σ
ε2 (69)
where ε2 is given by (16). Using (T1) and (T3) again, we get:
u′1 [gk (r (k) kL/n1)− δkL/n1 + gl (w (k) l1)] g′l (w (k) l1)w (k) = v′1 (1− l1)
(70)
which implicitly deﬁnes l1 as a function of k and L, l1 (k, L). Obviously, the
expressions of (k/l1) ∂l1/∂k and (L/l1) ∂l1/∂L are obtained diﬀerentiating (70).
Therefore, the equilibrium on labor market L = n1l1 (k, L) + n2l2 (k) implicitly
determines L = L (k), with:
kL′ (k)
L (k)
=
λ1 (k/l1) ∂l1/∂k + λ2kl′2 (k) /l2
1− λ1 (L/l1) ∂l1/∂L (71)
By direct inspection of Step 3 in the proof of Proposition 3, we deduce that
the number of stationary solutions is determined by the solutions k of:
g′k (f
′ (k) kL (k) /n1) f ′ (k) = γ1 (72)
Uniqueness requires that the left-hand side of (72) is decreasing in k. This
is satisﬁed if the following inequality holds for all k > 0:
ρ21 [1− (1− s) /σ + kL′ (k) /L (k)]− (1− s) /σ < 0 (73)
Note that using g′k (rk1) r = γ1, we obtain gk (rk1) /c1 = (γ1/ρ11) k1/c1 and
gl (wl1) /c1 = 1− (γ1/ρ11 − δ) k1/c1. Using these last identities, the expressions
of (k/l1) ∂l1/∂k and (L/l1) ∂l1/∂L, (69), (71) and (73), we are able to deduce
the corollary.
Proof of Corollary 2
We consider stationary solutions such that k1, k2, l2 > 0 and l1 = 0. From
the proof of Proposition 4, we notice that a steady state can be deﬁned as a
solution of ψ (r) ≡ Kd (r) /Ks (r) = 1 for all r ∈ (r,+∞) with limr→r ψ (r) >
K/ (n1k1) > 1 and limr→+∞ ψ (r) = 0. Therefore, there exists a unique steady
state if the following condition is satisﬁed:
rψ′ (r) /ψ (r) = rK ′d (r) /Kd (r)− rK ′s (r) /Ks (r) < 0 (74)
for all r ∈ (r,+∞).
Since ksi (r) is deﬁned by (64) andKs (r) =
∑2
i=1 niksi (r), we get rk
′
si (r) /ksi (r)
= −1− 1/ρ2i and:
rK ′s (r) /Ks (r) = −
2∑
i=1
κi (1 + ρ2i) /ρ2i (75)
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Using w = w (k) and r = r (k), the real wage can be redeﬁned as a function
of the real interest rate w ≡ w (r), with rw′ (r) /w (r) = −s/ (1− s). Hence,
using (S1) and (S3), li ≡ li (r) is implicitly deﬁned by:
u′i [gk (rki (r))− δki (r) + gl (w (r) li)] g′l (w (r) li)w (r) = v′i (1− li) (76)
The elasticity rl′i (r) /li (r) is obtained by diﬀerentiating (76): rl′i (r) /li (r) =
−ε˜is/ (1− s), where ε˜i is given by (17). Moreover, the equality L =
∑2
i=1 nili (r)
≡ L (r) ensures the equilibrium on the labor market, with rL′ (r) /L (r) =∑2
i=1 λirl
′
i (r) /li (r).
Using the proof of Proposition 4 and the equilibrium on the labor market,
we get Kd (r) = L (r) f ′−1 (r), with:
rK ′d (r) /Kd (r) =
2∑
i=1
λirl
′
i (r) /li (r)− σ/ (1− s) (77)
Substituting (75), (77) and the expressions of rl′i (r) /li (r) into (74), we
deduce the corollary.
Proof of Proposition 5
Diﬀerentiating (20) and using (21) gives
∂k
∂n1
n1
k
=
ρ21
εHk
= − ∂k
∂n2
n2
k
(78)
From K = kn2l2 (k) and (21), we get
∂K/∂k
K/k
= 1 +
s
σ
ε2 =
εHk
ρ21
+
1 + ρ21
ρ21
1− s
σ
Therefore,
dK
dn1
n1
K
=
∂K/∂k
K/k
∂k/∂n1
k/n1
=
(
1 +
s
σ
ε2
) ρ21
εHk
dK
dn2
n2
K
=
∂K/∂k
K/k
∂k/∂n2
k/n2
+ 1 = −1− s
σ
1 + ρ21
εHk
Cases (i) and (ii) immediately follow.
Proof of Proposition 6
From Y = f (k)n2l2 (k) and (21), we get
∂Y/∂k
Y/k
= s
(
1 +
ε2
σ
)
=
εHk
ρ21
− 1− s
ρ21
(
ρ21 − 1 + ρ21
σ
)
(79)
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Using (78) and (79), we obtain
dY
dn1
n1
Y
=
∂Y/∂k
Y/k
∂k/∂n1
k/n1
= s
(
1 +
ε2
σ
) ρ21
εHk
dY
dn2
n2
Y
=
∂Y/∂k
Y/k
∂k/∂n2
k/n2
+ 1 =
1− s
εHk
(
ρ21 − 1 + ρ21
σ
)
Cases (i) and (ii) easily follow.
Proof of Proposition 7
We have:
∂I1/∂k
I1/k
= ρ11
(
1− 1− s− sε2
σ
)
,
∂I1/∂ν
I1/ν
= −ρ11, ∂I2/∂k
I2/k
=
s
σ
(1 + ε2)ω12
and, from (20) and (21), (ν/k) ∂k/∂ν = ρ21/εHk. Using these preliminary
results, (22) and (23) imply:
dI1
dν
ν
I1
=
∂I1/∂k
I1/k
∂k/∂ν
k/ν
+
∂I1/∂ν
I1/ν
=
ρ11
εHk
1− s
σ
dI2
dν
ν
I2
=
∂I2/∂k
I2/k
∂k/∂ν
k/ν
=
ρ21
εHk
s
σ
(1 + ε2)ω12
with 1 + ε2 > 0.
Proof of Proposition 8
Diﬀerentiating W2 = [u2 (I2) + v2 (1− l2)]/ (1− β2), we get:
dW2 =
c2u
′
2 (c2)
1− β2
[
dI2
I2
− ω12 dl2
l2
]
(80)
which implies:
dW2 =
c2u
′
2 (c2)
1− β2
[
(1 + ε2)ω12
s
σ
ρ21
εHk
dν
ν
− ε2ω12 s
σ
ρ21
εHk
dν
ν
]
(81)
=
c2u
′
2 (c2)
1− β2 ω12
s
σ
ρ21
εHk
dν
ν
(82)
Proposition 8 immediately follows.
Deﬁnition of l2 ≡ l2 (k, Tl, tl)
From (T1), (T3) of Proposition 3 and (25), l2 ≡ l2 (k, Tl, tl) is implicitly
deﬁned by the arbitrage u′2 [(1− tl)w (k) l2 − Tl] (1− tl)w (k) = v′2 (1− l2). To-
tally diﬀerentiating this equation, we obtain the following three elasticities:
∂l2
∂k
k
l2
= ε2
s
σ
,
∂l2
∂Tl
Tl
l2
= −ε2 1− q21− q2σ12 > 0,
∂l2
∂tl
tl
l2
= −ε2 tl1− tl (83)
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where ε2 is now given by (26).
Proof of Proposition 9
Diﬀerentiating K = k (tk)n2l2 (k (tk) , Tl, tl) with respect to (Tk, Tl, tk, tl)
and using (28) and (83), we get:[
∂K
∂Tk
Tk
K
∂K
∂Tl
Tl
K
∂K
∂tk
tk
K
∂K
∂tl
tl
K
]
=
[
0 − 1−q21−q2σ12 ε2 > 0
− tk1−tk σ+sε21−s − tl1−tl ε2
]
The proposition easily follows.
Proof of Proposition 10
Diﬀerentiating Y = f (k (tk))n2l2 (k (tk) , Tl, tl) with respect to (Tk, Tl, tk, tl)
and using (28) and (83), we get:[
∂Y
∂Tk
Tk
Y
∂Y
∂Tl
Tl
Y
∂Y
∂tk
tk
Y
∂Y
∂tl
tl
Y
]
=
[
0 − 1−q21−q2σ12 ε2 > 0
− s1−s tk1−tk (σ + ε2) − tl1−tl ε2
]
The proposition immediately follows.
Proof of Proposition 11
Diﬀerentiating I1 = (1− tk) r (k (tk)) k (tk) l2 (k (tk) , Tl, tl)n2/n1 − Tk with
respect to (Tk, Tl, tk, tl), we get:[
∂I1
∂Tk
Tk
I1
∂I1
∂Tl
Tl
I1
∂I1
∂tk
tk
I1
∂I1
∂tl
tl
I1
]
=
[
− 1−q1q1 < 0 −
1−q2
1−q2σ12
ε2
q1
> 0
− tk1−tk σ+sε2(1−s)q1 − tl1−tl ε2q1
]
The proposition easily follows.
Proof of Proposition 12
Diﬀerentiating I2 = (1− tl)w (k (tk)) l2 (k (tk) , Tl, tl) − Tl with respect to
Tk, Tl, tk and tl, we get:[
∂I2
∂Tk
Tk
I2
∂I2
∂Tl
Tl
I2
∂I2
∂tk
tk
I2
∂I2
∂tl
tl
I2
]
=
[
0 − 1−q2q2
(
1 + ε21−q2σ12
)
< 0
− tk1−tk 1+ε2q2 s1−s < 0 − tl1−tl 1+ε2q2 < 0
]
The proposition easily follows.
Proof of Proposition 13
Because c2 = I2, the welfare of an impatient agent becomes W2 = [u2 (I2)
+v2 (1− l2)]/ (1− β2). Diﬀerentiating this equation, we get:
dW2 =
c2u
′
2 (c2)
1− β2
(
dI2
I2
− 1
q2
dl2
l2
)
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Using the elasticities of l2 (k, Tl, tl) and the proof of Proposition 12, we obtain
the following derivatives:[
Tk
∂W2
∂Tk
Tl
∂W2
∂Tl
tk
∂W2
∂tk
tl
∂W2
∂tl
]
= −c2
q2
u′2 (c2)
1− β2
[
0 1− q2 > 0
s
1−s
tk
1−tk > 0
tl
1−tl > 0
]
The proposition immediately follows.
Proof of Lemma 3
Since (29) is a static arbitrage, we omit the time subscripts. To prove that
the solution l1 (w, c1) of the consumption-labor arbitrage (29) is a well-deﬁned
function, we note that equation (29) is equivalent to:
ϕ1 (w, l1, c1) = w (84)
where ϕ1 (w, l1, c1) ≡ v′1 (1− l1) / [u′1 (c1) g′l (wl1)]. The elasticity of ϕ1 w.r.t. l1
is:
∂ϕ1
∂l1
l1
ϕ1
=
l1
1− l1
1
σ21
− ω21 > 0 (85)
because σ21 > 0 and ω21 ≤ 0 (Assumptions 1 and 2). Then, ϕ1 is a con-
tinuous and strictly increasing function of l1. Given w and c1, we further have
liml1→0+ v
′
1 (1− l1) < u′1 (c1) g′l (wl1)w or, equivalently, liml1→0+ ϕ1 (w, l1, c1) <
w and, under Assumption 1 (Inada conditions), liml1→1− ϕ1 (w, l1, c1) = +∞.
Such boundary conditions, jointly with continuity and monotonicity (see (85)),
ensure that ϕ1 crosses w once as l1 increases, that is the solution l1 of equation
(84) is unique.
Proof of Proposition 14
First, notice that λ1ε1/ (1 + ω21) > 0 and ρ11 ∈ (0, 1] entail Z > 0. Since
D (+∞) = 1/β > 1 and T (+∞) = 1+1/β−γρ21Z > 1+D (+∞), the endpoint
(T (+∞) , D (+∞)) lies in the open cone Ξ ≡ {(T,D) : |1 +D| < T} included
in the saddle-point region. Linearity of Σ and monotonicity along Σ imply that
there is a critical value σ∗ such that σ > σ∗ entails (T (σ) , D (σ)) ∈ Ξ.
Proof of Lemma 4
To prove (i), we compute the following derivatives:
∂σP
∂ω22
=
∂σF
∂ω22
= −s 1 +
1
σ22
l2
1−l2(
ω12
σ12
− ω22 + 1σ22 l21−l2
)2 < 0
while (ii) is obtained from:
∂σP
∂ρ21
= −1− s
ρ221
< 0
∂σF
∂ρ21
= − (1− s) γZ [2 (2− δ) + γZ]
[2 (1 + β) /β − ρ21γZ]2
< 0
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Solving ∂ (σP − σF ) /∂ |ρ21| = ∂σF /∂ρ21 − ∂σP /∂ρ21 > 0, we get (iii).
Proof of Lemma 5
We compute the following expression
∂S
∂ω21
= λ1
β
[
γh 1−ss + σ11
h−h∗
h∗
(
γ
ρ11
− δ + λ1h 1−ss γω11
)]
+ 1− β((
1
σ21
l1
1−l1 − ω21
) [
1− hλ1 (1 + ε1) + β λ1ε11+ω21 − Z
])2
Since h∗ < 1 < h < h, we obtain ∂S/∂ω21 > 0.
Proof of Lemma 6
To prove cases (i) and (ii), we compute the following derivatives:
∂σH
∂ω22
=
∂σF
∂ω22
= −sλ2
1 + 1σ22
l2
1−l2(
ω12
σ12
− ω22 + 1σ22 l21−l2
)2 < 0
∂σF
∂ω21
= −sλ1
(
1 + h 1−ss
βγ
1+β
)(
1
h∗ +
1−s
s
βγ
2
)
(
l1
1−l1
1
σ21
− ω21
)2 < 0
To establish case (iii), we observe that h > h implies:
∂σH
∂ω21
= −λ1
h∗
s+ (1− s) (h− βh∗) βγ1−β(
1
σ21
l1
1−l1 − ω21
)2 < 0
For case (iv), we note that ω∗21 < 0 implies:
h
[
4− (1− β)h∗γ 1− s
s
]
− h∗ (1 + β)
2
β
> 0
that is,
∂ (σF − σH)
∂ω21
=
1
2
1− s
s
βγ
1− β2
λ1
h∗
4sβh− h∗
[
s (1 + β)2 + (1− s) (1− β)hβγ
]
(
1
σ21
l1
1−l1 − ω21
)2 > 0
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